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Resume in French
Ce travail vise à analyser l’impact et l’influence d’un programme de sécurisation
formelle de la tenure sur le comportement économique (dont l’épargne et la
demande de crédit) des ménages ainsi que sur les perceptions de ces ménages
vis-à-vis la sécurité, leurs valeurs, et leurs objectifs. Ce diagnostic se fera à partir
des études de cas dans les quartiers sénégalais suivants: Sam Sam I, Thiaroye
Gare, Dalifort, Yeumbeul Layenne, Médina Thiaroye Karo 1, Médina Fass M’bao,
et Aïnoumady.
Un survol de la littérature liée à la tenure fait ressortir quelques thèmes
importants, dont les deux approches distinctes à la sécurisation des droits
fonciers, le modèle des incitatifs économiques, et le rôle de la culture locale et du
genre sur l’impact des programmes.
La méthodologie employée est une méthodologie qualitative qui se base sur 170
entrevues longues qui one été menées avec, en grande partie, les chefs de
ménages dans ces quartiers. Cette approche qualitative entraîne certains biais
par rapport à l’échantillon sélectionné et par rapport à la réaction des répondants
aux entrevues.
À part leurs divers statuts fonciers, l’ensemble des répondants, parvenant de
tous les quartiers mentionnés ci-haut, est un group relativement homogène. Il est
surtout important à noter que les répondants se considèrent comme propriétaires
de leurs terrains, même s’ils n’ont pas de titre formelle.
L’accès à la tenure formelle semble avoir une influence modérée sur l’épargne
mais pas sur la demande de crédit. La tenure formelle semble améliorer le
sentiment de sécurité des chefs par rapport aux revendications des autres
membres de leurs familles, mais pas nécessairement par rapport à la menace
d’expropriation. Les valeurs et les objectifs des répondants sont influencés plutôt
par le statut des répondants par rapport à leurs ménages et leur culture locale,
que par leur statut foncier.
Mots clés: tenure, titres de propriété, quartiers informels, urbanisme dans les
PED
Resume: English
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This research paper aims to investigate the type of impact and influence that
tenure regularisation programs in informaI settiements have on household
economic behaviours such as saving and accessing credit, as well as on
household perceptions relating to security, values, and objectives. This research
is in the form of a case study and is based on extensive interviews in the informai
settiements in the Pikine region where the Dalifort Method either has already
been implemented is currently being implemented, or has flot yet been
implemented. The communities included in this study are: Sam Sam I, Thiaroye
Gare, Dalifort, Yeumbeul Layenne, Médina Thiaroye Karo 1, Médina Fass M’bao,
and Aïnoumady.
An overview of the literature related to land tenure issues highlights the
importance of certain themes, such as the two distinct approaches to security of
land rights, the economics incentive model, and the rote of culture and gender in
the impact of tenure programs.
A qualitative methodology is used, and is based on 170 long interviews done
mostly with household heads in these neighbourhoods. The qualitative approach
entails certain levels of bias with regards to the survey sample, responses, and
interpretation.
Aside trom the different tenure status of respondents, the overail respondent
group represents a fairly homogenous group. 0f particular importance to note is
the fact that respondents consider themselves to be the owners of their property,
regardless of their legal tenure status.
Access to regularised tenure seems to have a moderate influence on household
saving but flot on demand for credit. Formalised tenure seems to improve the
perception of security for household heads with regards to daims from other
family members, but flot necessarily with regards to the threat of expropriation.
The values and objectives of the respondents are influenced by their status in
their household and in their culture more than by their tenure status.
Key words: land tenure, property tities, informaI settiements, urbanization in
developing countries
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I. Introduction
1.7 Urbanisation
The year 2007 wiII mark a critical shift in the way in which humans inhabit our
planet. In this year, for the first time in history, more than hait the people on earth
will live in urban, not rural, areas. This phenomenon of the growth, in both size
and number, of cities, known as urbanisation, has for years been the domain of
western industrialized countries. In the more economically developed regions of
the world, for example, the percentage 0f people living in cities increased from
52% to 75% since 1950, making urbanisation a standard tact of life in those
regions (Bloom and Canning, 2006). In the developing regions 0f the world,
however, a mode of life based in traditional, rural societies has still largely been
the norm. This is about to change.
The current phase of urbanisation, triggered by a range of factors such as
international trade policies, environmental pressures, changes in the global
agricultural sector, and shifts in labour market demands, is a phenomenon that is
mostly taking place in developing countries. For example, sub-Saharan Africa,
which lags behind most of the world in terms ot poverty reduction (Economist,
2006) and whose population has the lowest average caloric intake in the world
(Sachs, 2005), is the region that is urbanising at the fastest rate in the world (5e
Assemblée, 2005). Furthermore, given that the populations of the world’s 50 least
developed countries are expected to more than double by mid-century (Bloom
C
2and Canning, 2006), the scale and speed at which urbanisation is occurring is
unprecedented. Stemming in part f rom vast internai migrations which transplant
people from traditional cultures into overfiowing cities, and in part from the
endogenous growth of cities themselves, urbanisation today is largely a
movement of the poor and disenfranchised. Consequently, urbanisation is not
only a spatial and geographical phenomenon, but represents profound social,
cultural and economic transformations caused by shifting power dynamics over
the controt of urban land.
Struggles over land have, throughout human history, been at the source of many
crises, from war to famine. Land is flot only a source of production and of
housing, but throughout the ages it has carried much weight as a symbol of
social status and power. Consequently, conflicts over land can be distilled as
struggles for power and status (Nichols and Komjathy, 2004). As urbanization
increases, land within cities becomes rarer, more valuable, and, consequently,
more contested. For instance, since urbanization typically goes in step with
market-oriented approaches toward land emphasising commoditisation of
individual properly, it represents a challenge to the traditional powers of local
customary institutions which emphasize communal rights to land. Also, as a
movement of the poor with little ability to pay market prices for land, urbanisation
represents more often than flot a threat, flot an opportunity, to private developers
looking to profit from the increasingly scarce and valuable resource of
developable urban land. As a consequence, urban land markets in most
C
3developing countries are frequentiy corrupt and under the control of a few
powerful groups (Payne, 2001). As states often have a monopoly over land in
developing countries, urbanisation also poses a challenge to the power
structures ot municipal and national governments trying to keep hold cf their
power base of land. The result is an exclusionary, often corrupt, pattern cf urban
development which fails to offer sustainable and affordable land and housing for
the urban poor (Durand-Lasserve et ai, 2002). As a consequence 0f these power
dynamics, formalised land with legal records is the domain of the upper classes
and the dominant groups in the local social hierarchy, while the poor and
vuinerable populations cf growing cities, with little leverage to influence these
power structures, are left to seek their own housing solutions (Augustinus, 2003).
The urban poor have thus been forced to fend for themselves even as poverty
levels have continued to rise to unprecedented levels with intensifying
urbanisation (Baharoglu, 2002). In addition, the cities they have fIocked te are iii
equipped to welcome them, and often have outdated land registration systems,
inefficient real estate markets, few municipal funds, and ineffective and corrupt
administrations. The physical/spatial manifestation of this discontinu ity between
the ballooning numbers 0f urban poor and inability of cities to facilitate their
housing needs is the growth, both in numbers and in size, cf informai settiements
4(also called irregular, spontaneous, unplanned, illegal, and sometimes used
interchangeably by institutions with the term slum1’).
Informai settiements are those residential areas that have been settied and built
spontaneously by residents through self-build practices, and as such usually Iack
basic services such as water, sewage and electricity. In cities in developing
countries, where housing and land markets are tight, informai settiements can
house flot only the most poor but moderate and middle income groups as well
(Pugh, 2000). However, informai settiements generally mirror the map of urban
poverty, and the resulting spatial segregation in cities is a retiection of inherent
social and economic inequalities within them (Tribillon, 2002).
As they are neighbourhoods that have, out of necessity, been created without the
involvement of government administrators, they exist outside of formaliy
recognized reguiatory, legal, and planning frameworks. informai settiements are
thus considered by officiais to be without Iegitimacy, and even illegal. Residents
0f informai settiements are often aware ot the vuinerability of their extra-legal
status, and subsequently live in daily fear of eviction. Efforts to legalise and
legitimize the daims to their land, however, are thwarled by expensive and
complicated procedures for recording land rights and dominant public sectors not
willing to relinquish their control of land (Augustinus, 2003). informaI settiements
are thus detined by the insecurity of their legal status.
According to the United Nations, siums are characterized as areas where there is insufficient access to
water and sanitation services, where housing structure is ot poor quality, where there is a very high density
of population, and where land tenure s insecure (UN-Habitat 2003)
5Despite this insecurity, informai settiements are often home to most ot a city’s
population. It is estimated, for example, that between 30 and 80 percent 0f the
urban population in developing countries lives in informai settlements (Durand
Lasserve et aI, 2002). Given that the urban population in developing countries is
expected to double over the next 25 years, with growth largeiy occurring in
informai areas, the worldwide population of residents of informai settiements is
expected to double from about 800 million to over 1,5 billion by 2020 (Durand
Lasserve et ai, 2002).
As mentioned, informai settlements are defined by the insecurity of their legal
status. However, the insecurity residents of these areas face on a daily basis
goes deeper than that. Given that informai settiements are created out of
necessity by the poor, the insecurity in the iives of their residents is also
inextricably Iinked to poverty. Poverty is a complex concept and is subject to
varying def initions. A standard definition of poverty in recent years has used as a
gauge income levels 0f under $1 a day, or the local monetary equivalent that
corresponds to less than a 2400 caloric intake per day (Ki et ai, 2005). Some
prominent economists such as Amartya Sen, however, define poverty as the
deprivation of an individuai’s capability and the lack of freedom to choose values
and a life of personal worlh. The international community is increasingly taking
notice of more nuanced, multidimensional characterisations cf poverty. Current
evaluations cf poverly incorporate the capacity to satisfy basic human needs
C
6including heaith, education and employment opportunities, with the abiiity to
make one’s voice heard and detend one’s rights, as weii as the opportunity to live
in security and with dignity (OECD, 2001). Moreover, poverty is also increasingiy
associated with vuinerability and risk. Poor people are almost aiways the most
vuinerable in society. They are the most exposed to a wide array of social,
environmentai and economic risks, yet their vuinerable status means that they
are often unable to defend themseives against the related probiems and crises
that may arise (World Bank, 2001). Poverty is thus deeply intertwined with the
notion of insecurity, and this deep insecurity manifests itself as constant
presence in the lives of residents of informai settiements.
I. 1 J. Informai settiements, poverty, and insecurity
Lite in informai sefflements is characterised by poverty and insecurity due to iack
of basic services, environmentai and physical hazards, social issues and
economic constraints.
The rapid population growth associated with urbanisation increases the demand
for basic urban public services and infrastructure such as public transportation,
sewers, and roads. However, governments are mostly iii-equipped to face this
demand, and do flot have sufficient capacity, know-how, or fiscal resources to
provide adequate services and infrastructure to newcomers whiie servicing a
back-iog of aiready underserviced areas (Lali et ai, 2004). The illegal status
C
7associated with informai settiements often allows governments to bypass service
deiivery to these areas in tavour of iegaiised, weaithier neighbourhoods.
Compounding this probiem is the fact that there are often iimited incentives, in
terms of sufficient demand by able-to-pay customers, for private contractors to
want to invest heavily in these neighbourhoods and take up the public sector
siack. As a consequence, while the residents of formai seffiements of cities in the
developing world often enjoy leveis 0f urban services comparable to that cf cities
in more developed countries, residents of informai settlements almost aiways
lack basic urban services such as sanitation, drainage and soiid waste disposai
services. For example, while up to 80% cf wealthy residents of cities in
developing countries have access to water, less than 20% of poorer households
do (Rue! et ai, 1999).
In urban sub-Saharan Africa, where over 70% cf urban dweilers live in informai
settiements, sanitation coverage is estimated to be at 55% (Kiwala, 2005). This
makes basic hygiene, let alone prevention from contamination from water-borne
ilinesses such as choiera and malaria, very difficult. Added to this environmental
related heaith risk is the fact that many informai settiements are located where no
formai planning wiii go such as fiood zones. Periodic flooding can resuit in
deteriorating houses as weli as stagnating pools cf dirty water speckiing the
iandscape of informai communities. Environmental contamination in the form cf
air pollution is aise frequent, as many poor city dwellers live next to busy roads,
railway tracks or industrial zones. Poor quality dweIlings, which are frequentiy
C
$built on a temporary basis by the owners with tools and materiais at hand, can
end up housing many people over long periods of time due to chronic land and
shelter shortages (Pugh, 2000). Living in unsanitary, crowded conditions,
excluded from the basic services of the city means that environmental and
physical insecurity are part of the daily experience of inhabitants of informai
settiements.
Beyond these environmental and physicai issues, social aspects 0f poverty also
add to the insecurity in the lives of inhabitants of informaI settiements. Cities in
developing countries are typically characterised by pockets of wealth next to vast
swaths of grinding poverty. However, the rich people of cities in the global South
neyer have a reason to visit a slum, and the resuit is that sium dwellers are
invisible to their fellow urban citizens as well as to the administration (Garau,
2005). A corollary of this social exclusion is often a “gheffoisation” of informai
settiements, meaning that their residents are essentiaily trapped in their living
situation, and as such are virtually second class citizens within their own city.
This social marginalisation adds another layer of insecurity to lives in informai
settlements.
At the community level, however, social exclusion in the face 0f the weaithier
parts 0f the city is often tempered by local solidarity networks based on tribal,
religious and familial connections. As a result, pockets of fairly homogenous
religious, family or cultural communities fit themselves into the larger urban web
9through these networks. Areas within informai settiements thus often consist 0f
relatively homogenous groups with local community strength based on familial or
religious ties. However, a further implication of this is that newcomers ta urban
areas, if flot linked ta weil-established urban familles, may have tenuous standing
(Ruel, Marie et ai, 1999). In informai neighbourhoods, where de facto, or
informai, rights are often critical for survival, social exclusion at the local
community level adds another layer of insecurity to the iives of vulnerabie
familles.
Aside from unconnected newcomers who often become paying tenants in more
established households, women signify another vuinerable group within informai
settlements. An important feature of urbanization in African countries and in other
developing regions has been the growing numbers of women migrating ta cities
(Oucho, 2005). As a resuit, there are increasing numbers of women-headed
households in informai settlements. Globally, such households are especially
precarious, with 41% of woman-headed households below the locaily-defined
poverty line (Benshcop, 2003). Even within male-headed households, women are
especially vulnerable, with local culture often dictating that women have littie say
in community and household decision-making and little control over household
investments. The overall effect is that while residents 0f informai settlements
have littie power and are considered ta be invisible, even iliegal, by the broader
city, women within these communities have almost no economic or political
power, and are especiaily insecure (Augustinus, 2003).
10
Beyond the physicai, environmentai and social aspects of poverty that create
vulnerabiiity and insecurity for inhabitants cf informai settiements, economics
plays a key role. In tact, the greatest challenge for inhabitants of informai
settiements may be the iack cf weii-paying, steady jobs. For exampie, in sub
Saharan Africa, employment in sectors that pay regular wages accounts for iess
than 10% cf total employment, and the vast majority of the urban labour force
iacks formai empioyment (Ruel et ai, 1999). Most urban poor work in the
informai employment sector, perhaps seiling food or cigarettes in the street,
scavenging garbage dumps, or doing day work in construction. These are jobs
where wages are iow, working conditions are very hard and job security is on a
day-to-day basis. Additionaliy, households in informai seffiements typically have
a high percentage of inactive members due te iiiness and other factors. Such
precaricus economic conditions, where entire lives are ied in the informai sector
without the protection cf formai social security mechanisms such as pensions or
heaith insurance, can in turn generate more poverty as people have no reliabie
future in which to invest (UN-Habitat, 2004). However, whiie it is important to
understand the link between informai settiements and poverty and insecurity,
informai settiements are aise areas cf potentiai growth and deveiopment
(Wegeiin, 2004). As such, policies and programs aimed at assisting the urban
poor in informai settiements are increasingiy looking te buiid on this.
11
l.1.ii. Policies and Programs
C
National governments and the international community are coming to realise that
informai settlements in developing cities are not going to disappear (Durand
Lasserve, 2000), and have been ignored or flot taken seriously for far too long
(Kiwala, 2005). Policy winds have thus shifted course, from strategies of eviction
and dispiacement commonly practiced in the 1970s and 1980s, to practices
based on principles 0f inclusiveness and enablement which now aim to
strengthen, flot erode, the security of informai seffiements (Baharoglu, 2002).
Urban land itself is a key element in this new policy climate. As the primary asset
of the urban poor, land is a link to both market (i.e. credit) and non-market (i.e.
local governments and social networks) institutions (Deininger, 2003). it is thus
seen by many as the instrument that can push lives out of insecurity and into
security. This translates into policies and programs aimed at reducing insecurity
in informai settlements by solidifying resident’s daim to their own land, property
and livelihoods through land tenure2 regularisation3 (aiso called land-titiing,
legalisation, and formalisation) programs. What’s more, tenure regularisation
programs are promoted not only as means for reducing the insecurity related to
the illegal status of informai settlements and the fear of forced eviction, but they
are also advocated by international institutions as powerful instruments for
2 Tenure refers to the mode by which land is held or owned, or the set of relationships among people
concerning land or its product (Payne, 2001)
Regularizing refers to ways to bring informai settiements into formai systems. Some toois to do this include
sorting out an officiai tenure status, applying building standards and delivering development and services(Augustinus, 2004). in this paper the term regularization wiil be used in the context of according legai status
to household property rights.
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reducing the insecurity associated with urban poverty (Galiani and Schargrodsky,
2005).
The World Bank is wideiy acknowledged to be the most influentiai funding
institution working to improve urban informai settiements worldwide (Pugh,
2000). ils programs, whiie maintaining underiying principies of affordabiiity, cost
recovery, and repiicability, are guided by the correlation the bank sees between
land distribution, economic growth, and poverty reduction. It thus promotes
tenure reguiarisation as a means to provide the urban poor in informai
settiements with an economic asset, i.e. property with a legai titie, which can aiso
serve as a legitimate political and social base (Baharogiu, 2002). In this
framework, the increased security attained through property rights serves both 10
increase incentives for househoid Iong-term investment, which is a key element
underiying sustainabie economic growth (Deininger, 2003), as weii as to act as
ieverage for accessing formai institutions such as banks. However, this approach
has its critics. For exampie, the underiying assumption of such programs is that
househoids have growing incomes and wiii thus to invest in housing and other
durable goods. This assumption is highiy questionable, especially when
confronted with the reaiity of economic and social upheavals caused by
globalisation and the HIV AiDS epidemic (Tomlinson, 2001).
For its part, the UN has leU a Global Campaign for Secure Tenure and Urban
Good Governance since 1999 as welI as being involved with the Cities Alliance
13
Cities Without Siums program. It has additionally singled out regularised land
tenure as one of the key indicators for measuring progress in the implementation
of Target 11, the ‘Cities without Siums’ initiative of the United Nations Millennium
Development Goals, which seeks to achieve a significant improvement in the
lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers by 2020 (Payne, 2004). However, it is
becoming more and more apparent to policy makers that Target 11 cannot be
addressed in isolation, and that improving the lives 0f sium dwellers not only
entails increased security in terms of their legal status, but must equally be linked
to reducing insecurities related to urban poverty by improving, for example,
education, gender equality, health and governance (Kiwala, 2005). Beyond the
World Bank, UN-Habitat and Cities Alliance, numerous international institutions
such as the GTZ, ADE, USAID and others are involved in funding urban tenure
regularisation strategies in developing countries.
I. 2. Urbanisation: Dakar
Senegal is a democratic, multi-ethnic country situated on the western-most point
of the African continent. An otficially French-speaking nation, it shares borders
with Mauritania, Mali, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, and the Gambia (see image 1). As
such, it is part of sub-Saharan Africa, a region of the world where about half the
population stili lives on less than a dollar a day (Economist, 2006). Senegal’s
4The UN Millenium Declaration aims to improve the lives of at Ieast 100 milhon sium dweflers by the year
2020 : Target 11 ot Goal number 7. The UN originally had two indicators for this target: the proportion ot
people with secure tenure (indicator 31) and the proportion ot people with access to improved sanitation
f indicator 32). Indicator 31 includes two subindicators: the number of forced evictions, and the proportion of
the urban population who have documents as evidence of secure tenure (www.un.org)
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present-day population, at 10,5 million, is three times as large as it was in 1960,
when the population stood at 3,5 million. Consequently, the population is very
young, with the under-20 segment constituting more than half the overail
population (Comité National d’Habitat, 2004). Senegal has traditionally been a
rural-based society, with peanut crops and fishing as some cf the country’s
principle sources of revenue. However, Senegal is increasingly becoming an
urban society, with recent studies showing 47% cf the Senegalese population
living in urban areas (World Bank, 2002).
Image 1: Map 0f Senegal (source: maps.com)
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Despite relativeiy strong GDP growth rates in recent years, (4,3% from 1996-
2001; 6,5% in 2003) Senegai, with an average reai GDP per person of 1 465 $
USD, is among the world’s poorest nations (Ki et aI, 2005). The Human
Development Index ranks Senegal at 156th among the 174 countries iisted
(World Bank, 2002). In terms of monetary poverty, it is estimated that anywhere
f rom 48,5% (Ki et aI, 2005) to 65% (Comité National d’Habitat, 2004) 0f the
overail population lives beiow the poverty une, In terms of social indicators of
poverty, such as health, education, gender equality and environmentai risk
factors, there is much to be concerned about. Life expectancy is a mere 54
years, and aduit literacy is a 10w 37% (Comité National d’Habitat, 2004). Almost
a quarter of ail chiidren under 5 are mainourished, oniy about 60% of chiidren
attend primary school, and giri’s enrolment iags behind that of boys by about 10
points (World Bank, 2003). in fact, indicators of women’s income, education,
heaith, and social status ail iag behind those of men, marking women in Senegal
as a particuiariy vuinerabie group. Whiie the incidence of H1V, at 1,4%, iS 10w
compared to many sub-Saharan countries, morbidity due to malaria is high, at
25% (World Bank, 2003).
Despite this seemingly ubiquitous poverty, it can be said that Senegai is reaily
two nations: one approaching middle-income leveis with decent access to
education, public services, health care, housing, financial services; the other,
larger nation, existing near or below the poverty une and is iii fed, iii clothed, iii
housed, insecure and uneducated (World Bank, 2003). This polarisation is
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especially evident in the region cf Dakar, which has a Gini index of 0.5, which is
a strong indicator ot inequity (World Bank, 2003). The impact cf the devaluation
0f the CFA5 (the currency in Senegal) in 1994 and cf SAP Policies and
decentralisation in 1996 are said to have exacerbated poverty and inequality and
led to an overall degradation in the quality cf life for large segments 0f the
population (Programme de Gestion Urbaine, 1995). For example, wage restraints
and lay-offs associated with SAPs likely intensified urban poverty (Weissman,
1999), while increased prices of basic staples such as rice foflowing devaluation
adversely impacted poor households in particular, where food is a significant
portion cf the daily budget (Programme de Gestion Urbaine, 1995).
Decentralisation also gave municipalities more respcnsibility in urban
development and the provision of basic services. Part of this transfer of
responsibilities from the national to local level included the management of the
Domaine National lands6 in the region of Dakar. However, this transfer was done
poorly, withcut proper tinancial or human resource backing to support this
transfer cf power (Precht, 2003), resulting in overlap of responsibilities and
confusion (Gulyani and Connors, 2002).
Despite this administrative confusion over its urban development, Senegal’s
current rate cf urbanisation is one 0f the highest in Africa and is predicted to be
at 56% by 2015 (UN-Habitat, 2001). While increased urbanisation has affected
The conversion for the CFA , 2006, is approximately 450 CFA = 1 $ Canadian6 Law 64-46 ot June 17 1964 created the Domaine National, where ail non-registered lands and land with
no value added (i.e. cultivation or permanent structures ) became part of the state’s property (Abdou, 2006).
As a result, approximately 95% of land went under state control (Precht,2003).
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several Senegaiese cities such as Kaolack, Saint-Louis, Tambacounda, and
Louga as welI as some towns, urbanisation in Senegal has largely been
characterised by growth of the capital region cf greater Dakar, which alone
accounts for over 54% cf the country’s urban population with approximately 2
411 528 residents (UN-Habitat, 2001). Dakar’s annual population growth rate
from 1995 to 2000 was 4%, while for the country as a whole it was 2,6% (World
Bank, 2003). As in most cities cf the developing world, this growth has and
continues to take place predominantly in informai settlements, and has been
exacerbated by such factors as low household revenues, heavy administration,
and poorly managed real estate reserves. Despite some efforts to house lower
income groups through projects such as the World Bank-funded Parcelles
Assainies project in the outskirts of Dakar, the housing needs of the ballooning
population 0f urban poor have flot been met. In fact, studies show that housing in
the Parcelles Assainies went flot to the poor as intended, but, due to imprecise
selection criteria, speculation, and lack of understanding cf the target population,
ended up going to more privileged classes (Programme de Gestion Urbaine,
1995). Further, as in other cities of the developing world, the private sector has
not been interested in building for low-income streams in Dakar. In fact, it is
estimated that between 1976 and 1988, planned, formaI habitat produced by
both the public and private sector in Dakar covered a mere 7% of the demand. In
2000 this wide gulf between offer and demand persisted, with a demand for
approximately 25 000 units, but an offer that stagnated around 1 500 (Precht,
2003). lnevitably, the percentage cf the population with no choice but to live in
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informai areas, with insecurity related to legal, physical, environmental, social
and economic issues, is substantial and continues to rise.
Image 2: Map 0f the region of Dakar
(source: au-senegal.com)
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I. 2.i. informai settiements, poverty and insecurity
Dakar’s booming growth is currentiy being approached with a four-pronged
strategy invoiving: 1. development cf an overail cadastrai plan for the city, 2.
regularisation and restructuring 0f informai neighbourhoods, 3. creation 0f viable
land for public and private sector deveiopment, and 4, policing of undeveloped
areas to prevent further informai seffiements (Seck, 2006). Despite this, one of
the main outcomes of recent rapid urbanisation in Dakar is the proliferation of
informai neighbourhoods, which are estimated to represent anywhere from 45%
(United Nations, 2001) to 60% (World Bank, 2002) cf total housing in the region
of Dakar. This phenomenon is flot new. In 1952, in a move to rid the city centre
of spontaneous housing and siums, the administration in Dakar moyeU forcibly
removed residents f rom the city core to Pikine7, 12 km out of Dakar. However,
this move to clean up the city’s core did not have its intended effect of eliminating
the probiem cf informai areas. lnstead, more informai settiements were created,
just further out cf the city. Proliferating growth spread eastward aiong the neck of
the Cap-Vert peninsula (see image 2), overtaking, absorbing and integrating
traditional ethnic Lébou villages such as Thiaroye, Yeumbeui and Malika along
the way. This was done through househoid land purchases, usually from
traditionai Lébou Iandcwners, done outside legai structures (Precht, 2003). By
Since 1983, the region of Dakar has been divided into smaller administrative regions (‘Départements).
These are Dakar, Rutisque, and Pikine (Programme de Gestion Urbaine, 1995). The name ‘Pikine’ can thus
cause confusion as it can refer both to the original town of Pikine as weII as to the administrative region ot
Pikine. The administrative region of Pikine, or Pikine-Guédiawaye, includes Guédiawaye, Malika, Yeumbeu),
Thiaroye, and much of Dalifort. Ail the informai settiements studied in this research project are in the
administrative region of Pikine. Unless otherwise indicated, ‘Pikine’ and ‘Dakar’ wilI refer to their respective
administrative regions, and ‘Greater Dakar’ or the ‘region of Dakar’ will refer to the larger grouping of ail
three administrative units.
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1998, the population of Pikine-Guédiawaye, the vast majority of which lives in
N
informai housing built on former customary Lébou land, had ballooned from 100
000 to 1 045 000, representing the Iargest urban administrative unit in Senegal
(World Bank, 2002). This uncontrolled population expansion was the product of
the first wave from the inner-city in 1952, a subsequent wave from the drought
ridden countryside in the 1970s, and continued endogenous and exogenous
growth that will result in the population of Pikine doubling that of Dakar by 2015.
Many of the urban poor who have seffled here live on unregistered, illegal plots
that are unclean, overcrowded, lack basic services, and are often in f lood zones.
The informai land tenure status, combined with physical, environmental, social
and economic factors, resuits in conditions of profound insecurity in the informai
settlements of Pikine.
In terms of physical and environmentai conditions, for many years, these
neighbourhoods have existed without any substantiai investment in such basic
services as sewage and garbage disposai (Programme de Gestion Urbaine,
1995). A 2005/2006 outbreak of choiera, which is caused by contaminated feces
in drinking water, is testament to lack of proper sanitation services. Not only
does lack of proper drainage in Pikine’s impermeable soils cause unclean water
to stagnate during the rainy season, but fiooding is a regular occurrence. in my
trips into the informaI settiements of Pikine, I saw pools of water by the road side
(see images 2 and 3), and even in people’s houses, that had been there since
the previous year’s floods. In other houses, the water had finally gone, but its
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trace was stiil there in the form cf moulU and crumbling walls. Another trail left
behind from previous flooding, evident in the sores stiil marking many people’s
skin, was illness, not only cf malaria, which is rampant in these areas, but of
other maladies too.
Image 3 Pools cf
water by the road
side
Image 4 left-over
protection from
previous year’s flooding
Housing stock in the Pikine area looks fairly durable from the outside, with
houses made out of brick and roofs cf aluminium. However, it is estimated that
90% cf this housing stock is made through self-build or auto-construction
practices (Programme de Gestion Urbaine, 1995). This flot only means that
rooms are added and bricks are laid by household members or neighbours, but
the bricks themselves are made by hand. As a result, the houses can be cf very
low quality and crumble easily (see image 5). With overcrowding (the area of
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Pikine has a very high population density of 14 538 peopie per km2 ) that is
predicted to increase as a resuit 0f land scarcity and the inability for young aduits
to afford their own property, the condition of housing stock is iikeiy to worsen
(Abdou, 2006). Other physical dangers within the settiements include proximity to
the train tracks, which are in use but are unprotected (see image 6).
Image 5:
crumbling waiis
in pooriy-maue
house / ‘‘.—
Image 6: a train
passes through
an informai
market
Another eiement cf physical and environmental insecurity facing residents of
Pikine’s informai settiements relates transportation. b get in and out ot the area
and into Dakar, a resident must take crowded buses or ‘car rapides’ along poor
quality roads (see image 7) and highways for an hour and a hait to two hours
each way. Not oniy are these roads riddied with traffic jams, but the air is thick
with highiy poiiuted ieaded diesel fumes. This long and dangerous route in and
23
Q out of the neighbourhoods, combined with the 10w purchasing power of the
residents, must also act as a deterrent to food vendors. The fruit, vegetables and
fish I saw for sale in the markets of Pikine were of the worst quality, both in terms
of freshness and variety, which I saw in aIl of Dakar. In this way, transportation
flot only exacerbates health problems through pollution and risk of accident, but
is also a variable linked to malnutrition.
Image 7: Car
rapides and buses
try to pass across
poor quality, flooded
roads
Poor transportation affects not only physical and environmental insecurity, but
also exacerbates social marginalisation and exclusion. For example, severe
overcrowding at local schools8 drives some families to send their children ta
schools in the city, with children waking up at 5:00 a.m. to make the voyage into
Dakar. Other families are not so determined or lack the resources for such an
undertaking. The consequence is that Pikine, including Thiaroye and
In 1995, Pikine had only one Lycée, the Lycée Limamoulaye, which at 4 620 students was the biggest in
Senegal, but stili was extremely inadequate for a population then nearing 1 000 000 (Programme de Gestion
Urbaine, 1995).
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Guédiawaye, has the highest percentage of school-age chiidren who do flot
attend school. This is an especially worrying because young people make up a
large percentage of the local population. The polarisation between the haves and
the have-nots of greater Dakar will thus continue to grow as these young people
become aduits lacking formai skilis and education.
While the marginalisation with respect to the rest of the city continues to be a
problem for residents of the informai settlements, there is much strength at
community level. This may in part be due to a fairly homogenous population
overali, as about half of the population of Pikine is ethnically identified as Wolof,
and the population is over 90% Muslim (Programme de Gestion Urbaine, 1995).
As I found during my time spent in these communities, this religious homogeneity
represents much more than a social cohesion based on a shared belief system,
but the rituals and practices embedded in the Muslim religion, such as daily
prayer, washing, and worshipping in the evening at the local mosque, create
common daily routines where community members meet, thus enhancing and
strengthening social bonds. Within this larger community, there are pockets of
tightly knit religlous, family, or ethnic communities, such as the Layenne religious
community in Yeumbeul and the Lébou communities in Thiaroye. This tight
community connection is a strength, but it can also have its downside, as local
familial and ethnic networks often have a built-in hierarchy which can benefit
some households over others.
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At the household level, the insecurity of life in informai settiements has
manifested itseif in the form of matrimonial mutations, where men’s first marnage
is deiayed due to their poverty, out-of-wedlock births are frequent, and couples
must live within a large househoid (Gendreau, 1997). In one household that I got
to know welI, five of the young men living there, none of whom had formai
empioyment, had at Ieast one out-of-wedlock chiid. In none of these cases did
the two young aduits invoived ive together or marry. This exampie shows flot
only the difficulty the young have in being able to lead their own independent
lives, but also the added vulnerability of young women who uitimately bear child
rearing responsibilities. Beyond women and youth, renters and iodgers are an
especially vuinerable group. The Senegalese ethic of ‘Teranga’, or hospitality,
means that households not only share money within family and social networks,
but they otten lodge chiidren or aduit members, often f rom the countryside,
belonging to these extended networks. While this is another strong social tie that
knits Senegaiese communities together, it can also have less positive
repercussions, as the renters and iodgers are essentiaily at the mercy of the
households. For exampie, one lodger that I was acquainted with, a young woman
cousin from the countryside, toid me that she was only ailowed to sieep on the
fioor next to the bed of the househoid head, and that if she returned late for
meals, no food was saved for her. As for rent-paying tenants, they are often at
the bottom of the social hierarchy; their renting status showing them to be without
means or connections to own or to ive with extended families.
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O Adding to the physical, environmental and social insecurity of life in Pikine’s
informai settlements is economic hardship. 75% of jobs in the Dakar region are in
the informai sector (World Bank, 2002). This is especiaily true in the informai
settlements of Pikine, where unemployment is high (Abdou, 2006), and where
almost hait the households have a monthly revenue between 20 000 and 50 000
CFA (Precht,, 2003), which easily translates into iife beiow the monetary poverty
line. At one time there were steady jobs in the Pikine area as there were local
industries making shoes, textiles, and matches, but most have since shut down.
A sad but telling comment on this is that Pikine community eiders say that the
quality of life has gone markedly downhill in their lifetimes, and they worry about
the future for their chiidren.
I. 2.ii. Policies and Programs
For many years, the government of Senegal, as had been the case in central
Dakar in 1952, continued with its policy of slum clearance. However, in 1985 the
forcible removal of Lébou customary land-users from their land in the Dakar
neighbourhood of Arafat generated a strong negative public reaction. This
groundswell of public criticism galvanized a political response to urban land
policy. In fact, the Presidential Decree 91.748 ot July 1991 prohibits forced
evictions except in the case of public utility9 (Precht, 2003). This, combined with
An example ot this Decree being put into practice is currently occurring in Dalifort, where households are
being evicted for reasons of public utility and cleared out of the way for the construction ot the Dakar-St
Louis highway. The households are being compensated. However, they are being offered only 100 000 CFA
per m2, which residents say s too littie for them to be able to buy any new housing (Sarr, 2006).
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the creation of a new strategy toward informai settiements by the government of
Senegai and the German Cooperation Agency, GTZ, gave succour to residents
of Dakar’s informai settiements. The new strategy toward informai settiements,
known as the cDaiifort method’, after the pilot case impiemented there in 1987,
aims to enhance security of informai settiements by simuitaneousiy providing
iegal land tenure and basic infrastructure. It has since been impiemented in
numerous neighbourhoods of Dakar, Pikine and other urban centers of Senegai
and is centrai to Senegai’s overali national urban upgrading programme10.
in addition to keeping the population of informai settiements in situ, the Daiifort
method is wideiy recognized for its innovative way of iinking community
participation in decision making with financiai contributions (Guiyani and
Connors, 2002). This is done through the creation of Economic lnterest Groups
(GIE). The GIE, made up of heads of househoids who are the de facto property
owners (‘Propretaires ayant droits’), participates in decision making and
prioritizes the community’s needs with respect to services and infrastructure.
Together with the project impiementation agency, the Fondation Droit à la Ville
(FDV) GiE members determine the price they wiii pay per meter2 for property
10 The government cf Senegal’s urban upgrading programme is comprised cf four phases: 1. The Dalitort
pilot project (1987-1 990), 2. Enlargement ot program scope and establishing policy (1991-1992), 3.
Strengthening the means and instruments within the framework of a nationwide approach (1993-1995) and
4. Setting up an autonomous operator, the FDV (1996— present) (World Bank, 2002)
The FDV was created in 1996 along with other decentralization measures, but only started operations in
2000 atter it was officially declared a public utility. This transfer cf power was required by international
funders. The FDV is a specialized agency responsible for undertaking and organizing tenure regularization
and upgrading projects (Precht, 2003).
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tities12. it subsequently pools together member’s savings into a community
account and undertakes collection to ensure that participants pay. The idea is
that members of the GIE make regular payments with the goal of obtaining a
Droit de Superficie (DS), which translates roughly as a right of land occupancy
(World Bank, 2002), and is registered in the officiai cadastre. The DS is flot,
however, equivalent to a full legal land titie, as it carnes with it three conditions:
the first is that property must be primarily used for housing and flot for
commercial endeavours, the second is that if an owner wants to seli the property
she or he must first advise the local municipal administration, the third is that the
DS is valid for a period of 50 years (Coly, 2006). While it could be argued that
conditions 1 and 2, because of their subjective nature (i.e. how to define
“primarily used for housing”), leave open the potential for corruption, and that ail
three conditions put unnecessary restraints on the economic potential of the
properties, the counterargument in favour of the DS is that its affordability relative
to the prices ot full legal tities necessitates such conditions, and that these
conditions prevent distortions in urban land markets such as downward raiding.
The DS can also be seen as a steppingstone toward a full legal titie, as owners
of the DS can continue to make payments in view of eventually obtaining a full
title. An additional point to keep in mmd is that payment for the DS, although
considered by program administrators to be a reiatively affordable and symbolic
sum, means that in most cases homeowners are paying a second time for
property which they already believe belongs to them.
12 The payment s described by Malik CoIy ot the FDV as a symbolic payment. For example, prices in Pikine
and Dalifort range between 1 650 and 2 500 CFA / m2. In the surrounding area, formai, services properties
cost around 13 000 CFA / m2 (Coly, 2006).
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An outcome analysis by Senegal’s National Habitat Committee (NHC) lists
numerous accomplishments of the initial Dalifort regularisation and upgrading
program. Some of these outcomes are easily measured. For example, 92% of
programme recipients now have water hook-up, whereas only 1 % did prior to the
project, and 70% of houses now have electricity, whereas none did previously13
(National Habitat Committee, 2001). However, some outcomes listed are not SO
easily quantified. For instance, the NHC also attributes an increased feeling of
security to the project participants without referring to any studies to back this up.
The NHC also shows that investment in housing upgrading in Dalifort significantly
increased after the implementation of the project (National Habitat Committee,
2001). However, this change could equally be attributed to the recent departure
f rom the area of a local Marabout (religious leader) who had previously insisted
on houses only of wooden, not brick construction in his vicinity (Coly, 2006). The
Dalifort outcomes are equally questionable on the topic cf women. Whereas the
NHC states that “women are involved in the programmes’ activities on an equal
footing with men”, only 11 % of the households benefiting from the programme
were headed by women (National Habitat Committee, 2001). The NHC also
states that an outcome of the Dalifort project is an enhanced community climate
“based on trust, increased solidarity within the group ... (and) improved social
cohesion” (National Habitat Committee, 2001). However, this daim is not backed
up by study results, and does not address the equity issue cf distorted program
13 While such data seems straightforward, t ignores the common practice cf spiicing and illegally distributing
utilities such as electricity. Housebolds may have in fact had prior use cf electricity but had paid a local
illegal distributor.
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impact within the community. What, for instance, are the social repercussions at
the commun ity level for a GIE household that is unable to pay?
The Dalifort method, because of its emphasis on community participation and
responsibility, was awarded prizes at both the Cities World Summit in 1996 and
the Hanover Universai Exhibition in 2000 (UN- Habitat, 2001). However, the
Dalifort method has also elicited criticism for program efficiency reasons. For
example, while tenure rights are to be accorded at the last stage of the upgrading
process, it was found that many residents were uninterested in land titles once
basic urban services had been introduced and upgrading had been implemented
(Gulyani and Connors, 2002). This means that project cost-recovery has been
very 10w. In Médina Fass M’bao, where the Dalifort method was subsequentiy
implemented, the original cost-recovery objective from GIE household
contributions was 200 000 000 CFA. However, only 15 000 000 CFA, less than
10% of the goal, was eventually recovered (World Bank, 2002). In addition to the
low attraction of a DS for the local population once infrastructure had been
installed and security was assured, the 10w financial capacity of the program
stakeholders was also cited as a reason for weak cost recovery. A further, more
theoretical criticism of the Dalifort method questions the appropriateness of
applying an incentives-driven approach14, which presumes that formai tenure
security wiii act both as an economic leverage and as incentive for investment by
14 An economic-incentive basis of the program was contirmed both by Malik Coly ot the FDV, and by Oumar
Seck of the MUH, as the underlying principle guiding the current tenure regularization programs. For
example, bath men cited increased property value and access ta credit as key project outcomes.
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househoids, in the context of high insecurity and poverty. In other words, can the
poor really benefit from such an approach?
This research paper aims to investigate the type of impact and influence that
tenure regularisation programs in informai settlements have on househoid
economic behaviours such as saving and accessing credit, as welI as on
household perceptions relating to security, values, and objectives. This research
is in the form of a case study and is based on extensive interviews in the informai
settiements in the Pikine region where the Dalifort Method either has aiready
been implemented is currently being impiemented, or has not yet been
implemented. The communities included in this study are: Sam Sam I, Thiaroye
Gare, Dalifort, Yeumbeui Layenne, Médina Thiaroye Karo 1, Médina Fass M’bao,
and Aïnoumady. This work is broken down into the tollowing four sections: 1.
Literature Overview, which will discuss major themes related to tenure
reguiarisation programs in informai settlements; 2. Methodology, which will
describe the approach used and the rationaie behind this; 3. Results, which wiii
present, anaiyse and discuss the resuits obtained; and 4. Conclusion, which wili
summarize the study and resuits.
il. Literature Overview
C
lI. 1. Dïfferent approaches to tenure security
Land tenure is generaliy broken down into two main categories: formai tenure
(also known as de jure tenure) and informai tenure (also known as de facto
tenure). Formai tenure rights refer broadly to iand rights that derive their
iegitimacy from being registered and documented by a state-authorising body.
informai tenure rights derive their iegitimacy from an authority not sanctioned by
the state. This couid be as structured as a signed and documented local
agreement, or as loose as a general understanding among neighbours
(www.unchs.org).
This dichotomous approach to tenure systems is, however, an oversimpiification.
in reaiity, a continuum of tenure rights can exist within just one city (Payne,
2004). As a recent study in Columbia shows, even pavement dweiiers, though
their ievei of security is reiativeiy iow, have a network in place that serves as a
form of de facto tenure security (Aristizabai and Gomez, 2003). Thus, each city
of the world can be seen as a complex system of land rights and the related
interplay of various actors. Due to the involvement of ail ievels of society, land
tenure is a political issue (Payne, 2001). Further, because land tenure systems
are invoived with the allocation of a key resource, land, changes in the status quo
imply shifts in power between the city’s actors. By according some 0f the real
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social and economic power associated with formai land ownership to the urban
poor, tenure regularisation can thus be interpreted as a form of power-sharing,
democratisation and improved governance within the city (Deininger, 2003).
Unforlunately, some tenure programs have tended to aggravate tensions and
increase conflict over urban land instead ot using the opportunity to create a
more cohesive, inclusive city. The emphasis on individuaiised land rights in many
recent urban tenure programs, for example, runs contrary to the communal
approach to land allocation used in most traditionai tenure systems (Payne,
2001). This has often resulted in confusion and further conflict over land rights. In
many cities in Africa, for instance, customary and modem formai ownership
systems now overlap in an untidy tangle (5e Assemblée, 2005). In addition to
customary landowners, the private sector, the public administration, funding
agencies and, now, the urban poor, are key actors with their own needs and
interests at stake in the urban tenure debate. International funding agencies
generally want to run programs that have a likelihood of cost recovery and that
do flot run contrary to international human rights conventions. In particular, the
World Bank seeks to develop markets and stimulate growth (Baharogiu, 2002)
Real estate developers, with an eye on profit, are interested in keeping some
control over urban land supply and ensuring that prices remain profitable.
Governments and administrations cannot overextend their already strained
capacities. Their interests lie with maintaining some control of the resource, land,
and developing a tax base. Private land owners are usually members of the
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wealthy and sociaily-dominant classes. It is in their interest to ensure that their
property values remain high and that they are flot overburdened with additional
urban infrastructure taxes. Finally, the residents cf informai settlements, until
recently largely ignored by these more powerful stakeholders, are, thanks to their
sheer numbers, gaining political and economic influence. The needs cf this group
are diverse, as the residents themselves are diverse. Their generai needs
include the reduction cf social exclusion, enhanced security, and a sustainable
improvement in overail living conditions.
As this brief run through key stakeholders demonstrates, land tenure systems are
inextricably tied to the interests cf actors involved and the power dynamics
between them. As a resuit, land policies are cften the outcome of subjective,
preconceived notions and ideological viewpcints cf dominant stakeholders rather
than the result cf careful objective analysis. This scenario furiher means that the
potential for using land poflcies as a catalyst for social and economic change is
often net fully realised (Deininger, 2003). Some argue, for instance, that land
tenure regularisation programs based on technical rationality and financial logic
mirror the interests of dominant stakeholders such as funding agencies and
government administrations without Iocking at the broader context (Durand
Lasserve et aI, 2002). It is furiher argued that fer the interests cf the urban pcor
to be properly taken into account, an apprcach emphasising increased local
perceptions cf security, net the formalisation cf titles, is needed (Payne, 2003). In
fact, in some cases, title deeds are said te create more confusion than security
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(Smith,2004). Understanding these two opposing approaches to tenure security,
the one emphasising formalized tenure systems and the other placing
importance on the perception of tenure security, is critical for understanding the
heart of the tenure debate.
lI. 1. i. De jure tenure security
in this approach to tenure security, the formalisation 0f land rights is seen as one
of the most important catalysts in stabilising communities, in improving shelter
conditions, in reducing social exclusion, and in improving access to urban
services. This translates into increased security due to the ability of formai land
ownership to buffer risks (such as loss of physicai capitai, changes in social
networks, and diminution of income) and to stimuiate investment in durable
goods (housing, home businesses) (Baharoglu, 2002). The lack of a formai title is
thus a major deterrent to development and growth, as it denies residents of
informai settiements of a sense of stabiiity in the future, 0f a key economic asset
for investment and leverage, and of a basic human right (De Soto, 2000).
Protection f rom the risk of eviction is considered cruciai in terms of reducing
pervasive exclusion from mainstream social, economic, and civic opportunities
(Augustinus, 2003), and also in terms of sustainabie deveiopment. In a ciimate
of insecure de jure property rights, it is argued, individuals under-invest knowing
that others may seize the fruits of their investments. Formai iand tities, which
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should effectively eliminate the risk of forced eviction, shouid thus stimulate
investment and provide poor households with a valuable savings tool (Gaiiani
and Schargrodsky, 2005). Key to this type of security is that power of the state
can be calied on to enforce property rights. This requires confidence in
institutions which are accountable and accessible to the local population
(Deininger, 2003), which are flot corrupt, are enforced objectively, and are
administratively efficient (Lindner and Strulik, 2004).
De jure tenure systems are aiso argued to be essential for integrating informai
settiements into the urban fabric. This is partly because formai property rights
can facilitate urban service deiivery and can contribute to municipal revenue
through properly taxation (Guiyani and Connors, 2002). This is aiso partly
because instituting formai property rights requires registering and codifying the
land. This can improve the spatial ordering and organisation of the city, and can
iead to the development of city plans integrating informai settlements into the
larger sphere of the city.
Proponents 0f de jure tenure security aiso argue that land titiing is an essential
foundation for economic growth. The security f rom formai titling provides flot only
a basis for long-term capital investment, but provides the poor with collateral for
bans and credit, thus transforming dead capital into live capital (De Soto,2000).
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Further, studies show that formai tities translate into higher property values, and
an increase in property values is considered as a contribution to the deveiopment
0f land markets (Baharoglu, 2002).
Finally, in the de jure framework, individual property tities are associated with
human rights and social justice. Residents cf informai settlements are trapped in
their iives due te their invisibiiity and lack cf recognition by the formai system.
Lifting people out of this marginalised status through the mechanism of formai
property rights is net oniy a form of empowerment, but is akin to according them
a basic human right.
Despite these reasons supporting the de jure approach to tenure security, this
approach is increasingly critiqued as being too costly, unnecessary for accessing
services, not resulting in higher ieveis of security than other forms,
administratively complicated, and not viabie in countries that iack the capacity to
uphold an expensive system (Augustinus, 2003). instead of emphasising the de
jure approach, it is argued, other forms of enhancing security should be Iooked
into.
lI. 1. ii. De facto tenure security
As in the de jure tenure system, the de facto tenure system aise presupposes
security as a precondition for househoid investment and community
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sustainability. However, the de facto approach to security does flot consider full
legai tities to be the only means of achieving acceptable leveis cf security
(Payne, 2001). Rather, household security stems from a broader range of factors
such as the avaiiabiiity of services, the poiiticai ciimate, and community networks.
Furiher, this approach recognises that rights exist in a meaningful sense only
when community members recognize and accept them as iegitimate (Firmin
Seliers, 1999). Thus, programs aiming to improve security using the de facto
approach emphasise measures such as investment in neighbourhood
infrastructure to enhance a broader sense of community security and
emphasises the importance of enhanced rights in general.
in a fairiy typicai city of six million peopie in which 50 percent ot the population
lives in informai settlements, it wouid be necessary for the administration to issue
400 formai tities per working day, for ten years, to remove the backiog
(Baharoglu, 2002). if security can be enhanced in ways that wouid not require
such a heavy investment in time and resources, proponents of the de jure
approach contend, shouid these not be prioritised? An excellent exampie of
security stemming from a source other than a formai land titie is the Senegaiese
Presidential Decree 1991 prohibiting torced evictions except in the case ot public
utiiity. This resulted in an overaii reduced fear of eviction from residents of
informai settiements (Precht 2003). However, confidence in the legitimacy of this
Decree relies on confidence in a broad range cf institutions inciuding freedom cf
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the press, iack of corruption, and good governance1. In other cases, the mere
act of upgrading has been shown to be abie to establish a sense 0f security in
neighbourhoods that are stili viewed by the state as iliegal.
In fact, an examination of what constitutes illegaiity is necessary. Often residents
of informal/illegal settiements have acted in good faith to purchase their land
through iocaliy accepted means that the state does flot accept. It is thus essentiai
flot to blindly accept a categorisation based on ruies estabiished by a
bureaucracy and power structure bent on keeping hoid of its power. One shouid
flot mistake a police-state or a hyper-bureaucratised state with a state based on
just legai principles. Proponents of the de facto approach to tenure security
contenU that it is thus more appropriate to taik about un-conformity than to taik
about illegaiity with respect to informai settiements (Durand-Lasserve and
Tribillon, (2000).
For residents of informai seffiements who have Iived there for many years, their
perceived security of tenure may be indistinguishable in practice from
households living in legai housing. in many such cases, informai institutions wiii
have arisefl to compensate for the absence of formai property protection (Fieid,
2003). Land titiing programs may thus unintentionaiiy or inadvertentiy
discriminate against forms of de facto tenure which may be appropriate for large
In fact, the Iegitimacy ot this Decree s currently being tested in Greater Dakar with the eviction of
households for reasons cf public utility: the construction ot the new Dakar-St Louis highway. Households I
interviewed were tollowing this caretully in the newspaper to see if indeed evicted households were being
compensated. As t stood in the summer of 2006, evicted households were indeed being compensated by
the state, but they claimed that the amount they were to receive was inadequate for buying a new home.
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sections 0f the local population (Payne, 2001). Legal registration of land, then,
even when couched in the language ot human rights, is not necessarily a priority
for the poor, many of whom have no understanding of the implications of a legal
titie. In reality, land titling may simply be an easy solution for governments to the
chronic and severe low-income housing problem they face (Baharoglu, 2002).
Given these dichotomous approaches to tenure security, an ‘Intermediate
approach’ to tenure security is being increasingly promoted. The idea is that this
system will provide the benefits of increased legal security associated with de
jure titiing in the form of short-term, low-cost land titles, while looking to more
culturally appropriate solutions for the long-term. It is hoped that this approach
will provide short-term security while preventing some negative externalities
associated with high costs, rigidity and difficulties of implementation of many
regularisation programmes (Baharoglu, 2002), while giving local institutions time
to develop locally-appropriate programmes (Durand-Lasserve et aI, 2002).
Additionally, this approach encourages the idea that tenure regularisation flot be
treated as a stand-alone programme, but be combined with a package of
measures, such as increased livelihood opportunities and access to services,
aiming to improve quality of lite. Intermediate tenure is thus an attempt to bring
legality and legitimacy together, which is a major challenge for land tenure policy
(Deininger, 2003).
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Intermediate tenure, while it can be seen as a compromise between two
opposing visions 0f tenure, is flot without its detractors. For example, while
affordability and easy implementation, both hallmarks 0f the intermediate
approach, seem to be positive elements to any plan, they can be implemented at
the cost of according tities that have wider acceptance and valid legal weight as
far as financial institutions are concerned. In highly polarised cities, where
serviced and legal land is the purview 0f the wealthy and welI-connected,
intermediate regularisation schemes can appear to deliberately create a second
layer 0f legality especially for the poor (Durand-Lasserve, 2000). Local
appropriateness may also, on the surface, seem like a positive element to any
program, but it can also Iead to distortions such as the solidification 0f Iocally
applied biases, such as those against women’s right to own land. Thus, while
some argue that intermediate tenure helps to provide the ultimate goal 0f
affordable, accessible tenure, others see this as a dangerous idea that
perpetuates exclusionary practices (Du rand-Lasserve, 2000). Despite its
apparent spirit 0f compromise, the intermediate approach begs the question:
whose interests are served by this policy?
ii. 2. Economic incentives Model to tenure regularisation
Economic growth modeis have shown that economies without property rights
approach iower levels of income and consumption per capita, and that Iower
rates of investment can leaU to a permanently lower rate of growth (Lindner and
Struiik, 2004). The economic incentives model to tenure reguiarisation thus
associates the according cf property rights with stimulating productivity,
investment, and growth. In particuiar, credit is a key connection between tenure
and productivity (Smith, 2004). This model thus makes use of the de jure
approach to tenure security, where property tities serve as a iink te other formai
institutions such as banks.
The basic precept of this modei is that formai land tities are the key to unlocking
the economic potentiai of poor househoids. in this model, awarding land tities to
the urban poor is equivalent to both removing a constraint to their increased weii
being and to iiberating a key source cf capital for the poor. An important
proponent of this modei has been the Peruvian economist Hernando De Soto. He
argues that housing can be deployed as a poiicy tool to reduce unempioyment,
and to improve heaith by turning existing, insecure wealth into productive capital
(De Soto, 2000). Key assumptions to his theory are that a) the informai status of
much urban land means that it is used inefficientiy as it cannot be ieveraged in
the same way that formai land is leveraged for accessing bans and credit, and b)
informai land and housing are an untapped resource cf the urban poor (De Soto,
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2000). What’s more, the Iack of formai tities disproportionately disadvantages the
poor because poor households are forced to spend scarce resources to defend
their daims to property (Deininger, 2003). In this model, then, the attribution of
property rights transforms wealth owned by the poor into capital and promotes
investment in projects which couid lead to increased productivity (Galiani and
Schargrodsky, 2005). The economic theory supporting this model predicts a
straightforward relationship between individual property rights and the incentive
to invest in land and property, since the formai security of tenure increases the
marginai value of Iong-term, irreversible investments such as land and property
(Field, 2003).
Most studies looking at tenure regularisation through the economic incentives
framework have focussed on the rural sector. This can be attributed to the tact
that in the rural sector, land is more directly associated with production values,
i.e. it can be tilled for a crop or it can maintain a herd. In the urban sector, while a
home may harbour income-generating activities such as in-home businesses or
rented rooms, its Iinks to economic efficiency and productivity are often Iess
directly evident. However, this does not mean that the association of housing
and land with productivity 15 less important in the urban setting. In tact, recent
studies have shown some important connections between the security of urban
housing and land and economic activities such as labour efficiency, access to
credit and bans, and housing investment (see, for example, Field, 2003 and
Field and Torero 2004). In one study, land titling was associated with a 68%
44
increase in the rate of housing renovation within only four years ot receiving a
titie (Field, 2004). This result supports the Iogic of the economic incentives
model, which predicts increased investment in durable, productive assets.
The economic incentives model can be broken down into two components. One
component shows tenure insecurity to be a constraint on increased household
welI being. The other component ot the model shows tenure insecurity to be a
constraint on accessing and using the full value of land and property. A
breakdown of these two components follows.
Il. 2. i. lnsecurity as constraint on increased well-being
1. In conditions of no constraints, households utilise resources freely and
efficiently1 in such a way as to maximize their household utility functions2.
According to a unit ied economic model of household individual preferences, land
and business assets wilI be used to maximize household production, regardless
of the name on the title and registration documents (Doss, 2005).
2. In situations where binding constraints are present, household choices are
limited and resources are allocated less efficiently, often in a skewed manner.
1 Efficiency refers to maximizing a production function, in this case the household’s production function, and
thereby maximizing household utility.
2 A utility function s a reflection ot the values of an economic entity, in this case the household. t is a
generally accepted torm ot modeling the weIl-being of a particular economic entity such as a household.
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3. Lack of formai tenure security can be a binding constraint. Thus, in conditions
of insecure tenure, households make constrained, iess efficient resource
allocation decisions, reiated to securing their land and property through other
means. This diverts resources from more productive investments and from more
optimal points on the househoId utiiity curve.
4. As long as untitled households expend their own resources to solidify informaI
daims to land, the acquisition of a property title has direct value in terms of
freeing up resources allocated to this task (Field, 2003). Increasing tenure
security is thus equivalent to the reduction or removal cf a binding constraint, and
ailows households to make choices and decisions that better allocate resources
so as to reflect their household utility functions.
(A further necessary assumption must be that formaI titles are legitimate,
enforceable and that residents have confidence in them).
Outcomes:
1. FormaI land tities have a value that is directly related to the household utility
function and is thus quantifiable. This value can be calculated by measuring
changes in household’s economic behaviour resuiting f rom acquisition of the titie.
Holding ail exogenous variables constant (i.e. timing cf allocation cf title,
household location etc.), the magnitude of the shift in economic behaviour
resulting from the removal of the binding constraint (lack of titie) is a measure of
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the increased utility, and is thus a measure 0f the value 0f the land titie (Field,
C 2003).
2. Individuai househoids will have different levels of response to the removal of
the constraint. Each household wiil thus have a different value associated with
the acquisition of a property titie. This difference reflects the fact that some
households had fairly strong de facto security prior to obtaining a titie (the formai
titie has iess value) and some households had iess de facto security prior to
obtaining a titie (the formai title has more value to the household). Those
households with large shifts in behaviours resulting from increased security are
those that were the most vuinerable and insecure to start with (Field, 2003). A
characterisation of such households, which are those that can most benefit from
tenure regularisation programs, can thus be made.
Critiques:
The unified economic model is biind to whom the property titie is awarded to
within the household. However, according to a Nash bargaining solution,
increases in assets owned by an individual increase that person’s relative
bargaining position and lead to changes in household allocations towards that
individuai’s preferences. This means that there is a difference in the household
utiiity function as perceived by different members of the househoid. The awarding
of a title to a particular member of the househoid wili thus influence the resulting
changes in behaviour. This has strong gender implications, for example, because
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women and men in the same househoid have different needs f Kiwala, 2005).
Investigating the impact 0f increased tenure security on househoid weii-being
would thus require incorporating individual preferences and bargaining power,
and flot treating the household as a single economic actor.
Il. 2. ii. lnsecurity as constraïnt on accessing the full value of land
1. Land and housing are the single most significant asset and vehicie for saving
and investment for households in informai settiements.
2. FormaI land and housing can be leveraged to access bans and credit through
formai financial institutions. This is a big part ot the value and function of land
and property in developed countries. In particutar, access to credit is important
for increasing the potentiai productivity of a household.
3. InformaI households are barred from this value and function of their land due
to the informai status of their land. Households in informai settiements thus do
flot enjoy the actuai market value of their property due to the Iack of formai
property rights (Baharoglu, 2002).
(Severai other assumptions are necessary: First, in terms of value, formai
financial institutions recognise ail land titles as coibaterai for accessing bans and
credits, and the tities must be at no cost to the househoid. Second, in terms of
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function, poor people understand the concept of formai credit and do flot fear
mortgaging their properly to obtain credit.)
Outcomes:
1. In situations where ail exogenous factors are held constant, giving secure
property rights to the land already possessed by the poor can greatly increase
the net wealth of poor people. The increase of the price of the land is equivalent
to the value of usable asset aspect (De Soto, 2000). lncreases in land values
thus measure the enhanced productivity of neighbourhoods.
2. Households will seize the opportunity of increasing productivity by accessing
bans and credit through formai financïal institutions.
Critiques:
In terms of increasing the value ot land, issues of endogeneity arise in measuring
coliateral values of property titles by comparing titled to untitied households. For
example, the decision to titie property may be a function of property values or
perceived coliateral value ot the land once titled (Field and Torero, 2004). The
difference in land values can thus be fairly meaningless.
In terms of using titles as leverage, studies have shown that poor people are
highly risk averse and are reluctant to engage in the high-risk, high-return
activities that could lift them out of poverty (World Bank, 2001). This means that
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they are unhikely to morigage their homes in order to access credit and bans.
From the perspective cf the formai institutions, it has been shown in many cases
that collateral is irrelevant unless households can satisfy other criteria, namely
the ability to repay the ban. But even if incomes have been verified and
reasonable collateral mechanisms have been formulated, private finance
organisations may stili flot be interested in lending to Iow-income groups due to
Iack cf profitability on those small bans (Baharogiu, 2002).
lI. 3. Tenure and Culture
C
As discussed, the economic-incentive mode! relating to tenure rights is closely
linked to the de jure approach to property rights. However, the de jure approach
and the economic-incentive model are both critiqued for emphasising a single
option to enhance tenure security, the delivery of individual property tities, while
ignoring the complexity of Iocally accepted tenure practices already in place.
Critics of programs based on the titiing approach argue that policies that are
obllvious to the complexity of local cultural practices can lead to unintended
negative consequences such as illegitimacy, inequity and discrimination
(Deininger, 2003). Such programs, it is argued, flot only Iack validity at the local
level, but they fail to integrate cultural practices aimed at distributing and sharing
the resource in some equitable manner. The failure to take local cultural
practices into account is thus cited as one of the main reasons for the failure of
many land titlïng programs (Durand-Lasserve, 2002). However, developing
programmes that successfully integrate local culture without further aggravating
people’s rights has proved difficult.
Incorporating local practices into tenure schemes, it is argued, will accrue the
durability of tenure programs as the solutions will be deemed more authentic by
the local population (Sait, 2005). As tenure is often understood first and foremost
a social relation (Durand-Lasserve, 2002), establishing legitimacy of policies in
the community context is crucial. In Africa, where the social logic that drives
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human behaviour is through informai, flot formai structures (Hyden, 1997), it is
especiaily important for legitimacy to be established at the level of local culture.
Land tenure regularisation programs, especially those following the de jure
approach, can be akin to imposing alien structures on deeply entrenched belief
systems. This can furiher lead to accusations of perpetuating colonial structures,
or of forcing western value systems on local populations. For example, as in
many societies in West Africa, the Wolof and Lébou people in Senegal see land
as a gift from the gods which cannot be individually appropriated. The right to use
the land is thus rooted not in individually-based rights but in communal rights
belonging to tamily lineage (Precht, 2003). A tenure regularisation system
dependent on individual titles has little relevance in the context of these traditions
and beliefs. In fact, in the region of Dakar, customary land rights remain very
strong, with 10 traditional villages with the Dakar region recognised by the state
(Precht, 2003). The Lébou community, which has very strong political clout
(Seck, 2006), has repeatedly defended its customary rights in the face of
increasing urbanisation. As such, any program related to tenure that does not
take cultural concerns such as these into account risks having scant Iegitimacy at
the local level and subsequently little chance of sustainability.
Neglecting to take local culture into account can also resuit in the unintended
consequence of reducing some rights and protections embedded in local
practices. For example, in many cultures women are attributed certain specific
rights related to land use, while men are accorded different usage rights for the
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same land. in many communal tenure systems women had significant indirect
access and rights to use communal resources through their roles as household
managers (Benschop, 2004). Tenure systems based on individual (also called
freehold) property rights generally disregard this type of local practice. As a
result, titiing programs can disinherit a substantial portion of the population, often
women, f rom their traditional usage rights (Firmin-Sellers, 1999). This reduction
of the rights of women can be especially accentuated in programs where
household land titles are registered under the name of the “head of the
household”, who is most often male (Kothari, 2005).
A more subtle reduction of rights associated with tenure regularisation is the right
of cultural expression and the right to lead a culturally-appropriate life. In Africa,
for example, families and groups, flot individuals, are the dominant structure in
ociety, even in cities (5e Assemblée, 2005). It is mechanisms based on these
group structures, such as community networks, extended familles or ethnic
groups, which provide informai insu rance in the form of a mutual support network
(World Bank, 2001). Individualisation 0f property rights can thus be interpreted as
replacing this reliance on the traditionai group and its strong social capital with
the value of the individual and her or his independent productive capital. This
change 0f emphasis poses a challenge to the traditional value system already in
place. In Senegal, where the importance of the group is expressed through the
famous tradition of Teranga, or solidarity, social networks are credited with
tempering the economic crisis of the 1980s and 1990s. Through these difficult
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times, the urban solidarity networks served to compensate for inequalities
between family and community members (Programme de Gestion Urbaine,
1995). The implementation of a tenure system with security based on an
individual’s status with regards to the law and not to the local community can
mean that there are fewer gains to group association for property owners (Galiani
and Schargrodsky, 2005). In this way, programs that do flot integrate local
cultural practices can reduce security mechanisms already in place and can even
change the local culture and value system.
Despite the strong reasons for integrating local culture into tenure policies,
developing programmes that successfully do so can prove difficuit. There are
both theoretical and practical reasons for this difficulty. On the theoretical level,
customary systems can be hierarchical, feudal and patriarchal, especially to
outsider’s eyes. Deriving their validity from the values and perceptions 0f local
dominant social groups, these traditional systems can have the effect of
excluding or discriminating marginalised groups within the culture such as
women and minorities. (Sait, 2005). For example, in many parts of South Asia
and Africa, women whose marnages corne to an end through separation, divorce
or death are often evicted by their in-laws from the homes and land where they
had lived with their husbands (Benschop, 2004). Perpetuating discriminatory
customs is flot only unethical but is unappealing to aid agencies and funding
organisations who do flot want to be seen as reinforcing discrimination.
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In male-dominated systems there can be considerable resistance, both f rom
individuals and communities, to women (or other vuinerable groups) gaining
knowledge about and asserting their rights. This poses practical problems in
terms et holding inclusive and equitable workshops and information sessions tied
to program implementation (USAID, 2003). This type of conflict between program
values, which would normally espouse equity, empowerment and a gendered
approach, and customary values based on the wiII 0f the dominant local group,
poses a significant problem to incorporating local culture into programs.
Understanding the dynamics of customary practices, the real sources of their
validity, and the scope and nature of the rights they create is crucial to finding
sustainable ways to enhancing tenure security (Sait, 2005). However, in practical
terms it can be very hard for outsiders involved in program implementation to
really understand what’s going on. An example of an attempt at, but ultimate lack
of understanding of local culture is the frequent decision to award property titles
to “household heads”, as is done in Senegal. On the one hand, this appears to
be an attempt by implementing agencies to adapt to locally accepted power
dynamics. On the other hand, a lack of understanding that “household head” is
almost inevitably male leads these programs to be administered with a strong
gender bias. Compounding this is the fact that most decision-makers and
decision-making bodies (such as the GIE) in titling programmes are made up 0f
men. As such, programs are often decided in a manner based on men’s cultural
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perceptions and their personal interests, without taking into account women’s
reality (USAID, 2003).
Is there a solution to the complex problem of incorporating local culture into
programs and policy such that equity issues are addressed as well as cultural
appropriation? Some innovative measures aiming to address some of the issues
mentioned above have begun to take root, especially in the rural sector, where
communal land trusts have been set up f Lallau and Langlade, 2005). These
accord property rights to a community, not to an individual, and attempt to
account for equity within the group. In general, the de facto approach to tenure
security takes steps in the direction of cultural integration, and promotes the
reinforcement of ail rights through the establishment of transparent institutions,
and the deliberate communication with local populations both before, during and
after program implementation.
lI. 4. Tenute and Gender1
C
in aimost ail countries, whetherdeveloped or developing, security cf tenure for
women is aimost entirely dependent on the men they are associated with
(Benschop, 2003). Women’s rights to own, inherit, manage, and dispose of
property are under constant attack from customs, laws, and individuals. This
situation seriousiy undercuts women’s social and economic status, and has far
reaching consequences for ail cf society.
Women are increasingly seen by the international community as a key to
sustainabie development. This is due to their frequent roie as caregivers. in
Africa, for example, women caregivers contribute immensely to the economy,
otten carrying burdens that are normaliy borne by a government
(Gumbonzvanda, 2005). This is also due to evidence from around the world that
indicates that women dedicate most of the earnings they control to fulfiiling
household needs, whiie men often spend much cf their income on personal items
(USAiD, 2003). This can mean that greater control of assets by women resulîs in
higher levels 0f spending on social goods such as children’s education, health,
and food, thus increasing the prcductivity and sustainability of a household and,
by extension, 0f a society. Greater control cf assets by women, however, is
elusive. 0f the world’s 1 billion poorest people, for example, three-fifths are
1
‘Gender’ refers to the socially constructed rather than biologically determined raies of men and women as
weIl as the reiationships between men and women in a given society at a specific time and place. These
raies and reiationships are not fixed, but can and do change in the light of evolving needs and opportunities(Zaoude et aI, 2003)
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women and girls (Zaoude et aI, 2003). In many countries, indicators 0f income,
health, education and social status Iag behind those of men. This situation is so
critical that the UN has Iisted the promotion of women’s equality as the third
MDG.
Until women have power and control in the processes that conter real social and
economic power, however, women wiII continue to be subordinate to men
(Lacroux and Trujillo, 2003). In this light, tenure regularisation programs could be
seen as being beneticial towards women, as land and property conter power on
their owners. In gender-neutral tenure regularisation programs, anyone can be
conferred a titie regardless of her or his sex. However, ownership may be
determined by other factors such as an individual’s ability to pay or status within
the household. As women frequently have little cash income, minimal political or
even household power, as well as a famiIy to maintain, they face serious
constraints in their ability to purchase land or even to be awarded tities (Lacroux
and Trujillo, 2003). For instance, the vast majority of women in Africa cannot
afford to buy land. They can therefore only access it through marital or family
relations, making them dependent on and subordinate to men (Benschop, 2004).
In addition to poverty, prevailing social institutions can exacerbate inequality for
women. This can be through direct mechanisms such as the exclusion of women
from certain types of work, or through indirect mechanisms such as limiting
access to resources such as land and property (Jûtting and Morrisson, 2005).
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Thus, for women, ownership of land and housing can increase their status in
societies where economic assets and resources are increasingly determinants of
power and independence (Lacroux and Trujillo, 1999). This increased status can
make a difference both at the community level and within the household. For
example, ownership of land titles is associated with a significant shift in the
degree to which women report participating in household decisions (Doss, 2005).
As women have different needs than men based on household division of labour,
this increased involvement in decision-making can lead to resource allocation
that better reflects their distinct needs. Also at the household level, women who
have less secure rights to adequate housing are shown to be parlicularly
vuinerable to violence (Kothari, 2005), and without some form of tenure security it
is difficult for women to leave abusive and violent households. Increasing female
access to land can thus help remove abusive and discriminatory practices that
are obstacles to women’s empowerment. While the reasons for integrating
gender issues into development policies such as tenure regularisation are
numerous, developing programs and implementing projects that successfully do
so has proved difficult.
In no area of international development is the gap between stated intentions and
operational reality as wide as it is in the promotion of equality between men and
women (Zaoude et aI, 2003). This is partly because women, as a vulnerable
group, are especially at the mercy of local perceptions of rights. Thus, even if
equality before the law is legislated relating to such areas as marnage and
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divorce, inheritance, and equal access to education, as it is in Senegal, in many
cases this equality is flot put into practice. lnstead, local customs which favour
men continue te be used (Lallau and Langlade, 2005). Moreover, gender-neutral
laws are often grounded in norms, values and practices that favour male life
situations. For example, in Senegal tenure regularisation is deciared to be a
gender neutral process where either men or women can be awarded the DS.
However, the practice cf awarding cf the DS te heads of households means that,
despite the gender-neutral process, the overwhelming majority of titles are
awarded to men. As such, gender-neutral policies and laws, which are meant to
put women and men on equal footing, can resuit in large groups cf female land
users being worse-off than their male counterparts. Situations where gender
neutral laws and policies have different effects for women and men constitute
indirect discrimination (lkdahl et ai, 2005). Some efforts are being made te
counter these kinds cf impacts. In the recent nation-wide land titiing program in
Peru, for instance, a key objective of the titiing program was to equalize the
gender distribution of land and property assets. To accomplish this, the program
guidelines instructed that, among common-iaw and legally married household
heads, both spouses’ names appear on government-issued property documents
(Field, 2003).
Integrating gender interventions into diverse programs such as tenure
regularisation, instead of separating gender and treating it independently as a
‘women’s issue,’ is considered to be an essential step toward achieving genuine
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gender equality. Enforcing a broad spectrum of women’s rights, increasing
women’s awareness cf their rights, women’s inclusion in decision-making and
governance structures, as well as legislative and administrative reforms are ail
key components to gender mainstreaming2. Thus, integrating gender requires
iong-term investments and commitments by policymakers as weii as a shift in the
way macroeconomic policies are approached (Neimanis, 2002). However,
macroeconomic structures such as NEPAD often see equaiity being achieved by
micro-specific projects, instead cf through fundamental structural changes,
inciuding land reform, addressing women’s poverty and inequaiity (Zaoude et aI,
2003). As such, the predicament of women, and in particular cf poor urban
women, has yet to be effectiveiy acknowiedged in many current poverty
reduction strategy papers, in national poverty reduction programmes, and other
sectoral reforms.
2
‘Gender mainstreaming’ was defined by the UN Economic and Social Council in 1997 as a strategy for
making women’s as welI as men’s concerns and experiences an integral dimension of the design,
implementation, monitoring and evaluation ot the policies and programs in ail political, economic and
societal spheres so that women and men benefit equally and inequality ins flot perpetuated (Zaoude et ai,
2003)
III. Methodoiogy.
This research paper aims to investigate the type of impact and influence that
tenure regularisation programs in informai settiements have on househoid
economic behaviours such as saving and accessing credit, as weII as on
househoid perceptions reiating to security, values, and objectives. This research
is in the form of a case study and is based on extensive interviews in the informai
settiements in the Pikine region. The communities included in this study are: Sam
Sam I, Thiaroye Gare, Daiifort, Yeumbeui Layenne, Médina Thiaroye Karo 1,
Médina Fass M’bao, and Aïnoumady.
III. 1. Quantitative methods
The original idea for this paper was to base it on the quantitative methodoiogy
deveioped by Field in her iandmark studies on the effects of tenure reguiarisation
on household behaviour in Peru (Fieid, 2003,..., Fieid and Torero 2004). This
wouid have entailed a rigorous quantitative study on the impact of tenure
reguiarisation programs on economic behaviours of househoids in Pikine.
However, while the conceptual framework of Field’s approach proved invaiuable
for understanding the economic logic at work, a purely quantitative approach
turned out to be both inappropriate and infeasible in Senegal. The difficulty of
using the quantitative approach was reiated to three key issues: endogeneity,
program characteristics, and quaiity of avaiiable data.
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III. 1. i. Conceptualframework
The conceptual framework used by Field follows the logic of the economic
incentive model related to tenure, with tenure insecurity modelled as a direct and
binding constraint on efficient househoid resource allocation. Field sets up the
direct relationship between formai tenure insecurity and househoid behaviour (in
this case, allocation of labour) as follows:
There are three principal mechanisms by which it is assumed that
tenure insecurity removes individuals from the labor force. First,
individuats in untitled households are constrained by the need to
provide informai policing.... If prospective squatters seek out
abandoned land, signaling that the property is occupied may deter
conflicts over land or property boundaries. Second, reducing the
probability of government eviction at the community level may require
a critical mass of individuals squatting on neighborhood land,
particularly in early stages of community formation. As a result, social
norms may evolve at the community level such that households that
do not spend time squatting on neighborhood land, which is good for
the entire neighborhood, are punished by other community members.
Finaliy, households may attempt to increase tenure security through
formai channels by going through administrative steps to acquire land
rights. In addition, greater tenure security may encourage household
members to work on account of an increase in the value of
consumption cf immobile assets such as housing infrastructure.
(FielU, 2003)
In demonstrating that there are household behaviours which are directly
influenced by the lack of formai tenure security, Field shows lack of formai tenure
to be a binding constraint which adversety affects the household’s abillty to
allocate resources efficiently.
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The household utility function developed by Field is as follows:
Ufx, I, s; y, E), where s= s(Z q t)
(FieId, 2003)
where:
• U represents utility,
• x represents household consumption,
• I represents leisure,
• s represents household security,
• y is a set of household characteristics,
• E is resource endowment,
• Z is the total hours of household time spent by tamily members at home
protecting the house,
• q reflects the household’s level of formai property rights, and
• t reflects the degree cf informai or de facto rights the househoid has
acquired.
In Field’s framework, then, household utility, U, is determined by a household’s
ability to maximize leisure, consumption of goods, and home security, given a
common set of household characteristics and resource endowment (i.e.
household budget). This means, for example, that if leisure increases and
household characteristics and budget stay the same, there must be a trade-off
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for this increase in terms of reduced consumption or security. Household
security, s, is in turn determined by the following three parameters: Z, total hours
of household tïme spent by family members “protecting” property, q, which
reflects the househoid’s level of formai property rights (i.e. having a formai
property title or not), and t, which reflects the degree cf informai or de facto rights
the househoid has acquired through, for example, iength of residency in the
neighbourhood (Field, 2003).
The innovation in this model is the inclusion cf security, s, in the household’s
utility tunction along with consumption and leisure, which are standard household
utility parameters. The inclusion of s signifies an imperfect or distorted model. In
the standard modei, a househoid chooses to maximise a bundie of household
goods, as defined by leisure and consumables, within a given budget. in this
standard model there is a trade-off, necessitated by the particuiar household’s
budget constraint, between these two of goods: more leisure (i.e. iess work)
entails fewer consumabies (i.e. iess income for purchasing of goods) in the
overall bundie of goods, or vice-versa. The incorporation of an additionai good
into this bundie, household security, with no concomitant increase in the
household’s resources, thus implies that resources (i.e. time, income) that would
otherwise go toward obtaining leisure and consumable goods are instead
allocated to increasing Z and perhaps t, in order to obtain greater security. There
is thus an inefficiency and distortion associated with conditions of imper[ect
secu rity.
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The exogenous parameter, q, which reflects the household’s level of formai
property rights, can be modeiied as a binary variable feither there is formai
security or there is flot), and is the variable at the crux of Field’s model. in other
words, can a change in the value of q (i.e. from O to 1) resuit in a sufficient
increase in s such that househoids can refocus their resources on a more
efficient bundle of goods?
Fieid deveiops this model further by relating her distorted utiiity function to
various forms cf economic behaviour. For exampie, labour supply enters into the
model through its relation to the parameters invoiving time (I, leisure and Z,
household protection) and to the parameter of home consumption, x (Fieid,
2003). Field’s basic estimate cf the titiing program’s effect on labour supply is
thus represented by the foliowing OLS regression:
Li =80 + 37(N) + 62(N)2 + [33(squatter) ÷ 84(program) + 85(program*squatter) +
a Xi+ei,
(Fieid 2003)
whe re:
• Li refers to a measure of household labour supply;
• N is number cf household members;
squatter refers to a household with no pre-program property titie;
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• program indicates whether the household lives in a neighbourhood that
has been reached by the program; and
• Xi is a vector ot demographic controls.
• (Bs are coefficients)
The coefficient on the interaction between program and squatter, 85, is the
estimated program etfect, which provides a measure of the average difference in
time worked by ex-squatters in program areas versus non-program areas (Field,
2003).
The conceptual framework cf Field’s approach is useful for understanding the
economic trade-off logic of household resource allocation. Potential problems
with Field’s model include the tact that the household utility function is flot turther
broken down to include individual preferences and bargainiflg within the
household (which she herseit admits to), and, turther, the fact that her utility
tunctions are based on her own educated assumptions relatiflg to household
behaviour, flot on studies done in-situ.
III. 1. ii. Applicability in Senegal
While Field’s quantitative approach proved fruitful in the analysis of land titiing
impacts in Peru, the reliance on a purely quantitative approach turned out to be
both iflappropriate and infeasible in Seflegal. The difficulty in using the
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quantitative approach here was mainly related to three key issues: endogeneity,
regularisation programs tied to upgrading, and quality of available data.
An important obstacle to measuring the influence of tenure security is the
potential endogeneity of ownership rights, i.e. where the allocation 0f property
rights is flot random but is based on wealth, family characteristics, political
influence, and other endogenous factors. The Peruvian tenure regularisation
program, in which households were assigned property tities irrespective of
several key potentially problematic endogenous factors, helped Field to isolate
the causal effect 0f titling on behaviour. The allocation of tities could thus, from
an analytical standpoint, be assumed to have been done at random. For
example, land titling in Peru was done in a way that was virtually cost-free to
households, at a national scale, at an extremely rapid pace, and without
upgrading programs attached (Field, 2004). These factors were essential in
helping to eliminate endogeneity relating to neighbourhood selection, timing, and
the impact ot upgrading.
In Senegal, however, none of these factors held true. For instance, mirroring
practices in many African cities, the selection of neighbourhoods is based on a
combination of needs assessment and willingness to pay and participate on the
part 0f the community (Gulyani and Connors, 2002). In the case of some informaI
neighbourhoods of Dakar, such endogeneity went even furiher. Neighbourhoods
often self-selected by approaching the FDV and the MUH themselves (Coly,
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2006), thus indicating the presence of several endogenous factors such as: a
pre-perceived positive outcome of the project by the community, cohesion of
community interests (or at Ieast a strong leadership), and an ability or willingness
to pay.
Another key problem for basing a study solely on quantitative analysis was the
nature of the regularisation program implemented in Senegal. In Senegal, unlike
in Peru, tenure regularisation went hand-in-hand with neighbourhood upgrading.
This makes it very difficuit to show causality between tenure regularisation and
changes in household behaviour. Also, the fact that residents had to pay for the
DS added a distortion into the results, in terms of those able to pay and those
not able to pay.
In addition to such problematic methodological issues, a research approach
based on quantitative analysis in Senegal was also hampered by practical
considerations. Key to any quantitative analysis is to availability of high quality,
reliable data. In Peru, Field had access to results of a survey of 2 750 urban
households that had been conducted midway through program implementation
(Field, 2003). This allowed her to disaggregate and analyze survey data based
on households that had already received land tities and those who had not. In
Senegal, an indispensable collaborator in obtaining data was the Agence
Nationale de la Statistique et de la Démographie (ANSD)1. While the ANSD
The GTZ was also requested several times to provide data for analysis, but no response from this
organization came forth. The FDV and the MUH were also asked to contribute neighbourhood surveys
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obliged with requests for household data, several difficulties were encountered.
f
One problem was finding an appropriate scale within national-level studies to
break down the surveys. More often than not, the area surveyed did not
correspond with community sizes appropriate to areas impacted by regularization
programmes. Compounding this was the fact that the delineation of
neighbourhoods and survey zones used, for example, in J 995-6 survey collection
did flot correspond to the geographic zones used either in previous or later
studies. This meant that comparisons between different years were very difficuit
to do. A second but related problem was the issue of adequate sample size.
Because the household surveys conducted by the ANSD had been national in
scale, when these were broken down to neighbourhood scale there were very
few households included, sometimes even none. Basing valid statistical
interpretation on such small sample sizes is not possible.
III. 2. Qualitative methods
The issues of endogeneity, ot regularisation tied to upgrading, and of quality of
available data made a study based on quantitative methodology inappropriate
and infeasible in Senegal. Because of this, and because tenure regularisation
programs often involve less quantifiable factors such as local power dynamics,
cultural appropriation and gendered impacts, a case study based on a qualitative
conducted prior to program implementation (Seck, 2006, CoIy, 2006). However, locating these surveys
proved difficuit, and no post-implementatfon surveys were mentioned.
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research looking flot only at economic behaviour but also at values and
perceptions, was implemented instead.
As such, a series of semi-structured long-interviews was conducted in informaI
sefflements in the Pikine area (Sam Sam I, Thiaroye Gare, Dalitort, Yeumbeul
Layenne, Médina Thiaroye Karo 1, Médina Fass M’bao, and Aïnoumady). This
area was chosen due to the different status of tenure in each smaller
neighbourhood. For example, Yeumbeul Layenne and Médina Thiaroye Karo 1
are off icially-recognized traditional villages with communal land rights. Sam Sam
1, Médina Fass M’bao, and Aïnoumady have ongoing tenure regularisation and
upgrading programs that were started over 5 years ago. Thiaroye Gare has an
ongoing regularisation and upgrading project that has been recently undertaken.
As such, only part of the neighbourhood has been reached. Dalifort had a tenure
regularisation and upgrading program that finished several years ago. The
neighbourhoods are adjacent to one another in the Pikine area, which eliminates
some exogenous factors related to differing locations that could distort the
resuits. The methodology of semi-structured long-interviews was chosen. This
was used instead of using closed questionnaires or broader focus groups
because it has been identified as an effective approach for gaining insight into
diverse and particular types of impacts across a group of households affected by
a development program, especially if endogeneity is present (Wright and
Copestake, 2004). The premise of this approach is that an in-depth
understanding of households, in terms of their Iivelihoods, their values and their
C
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norms, can lead to a household-appropriate analysis of a program’s impact.
Thus, while a qualitative approach cannot remove problems tied to program
endogeneity, it can integrate questioning related to this into interviews, thus
resulting in a more nuanced understanding of the situation.
As such, 170 household heads, with an average of 24 in each neighbourhood,
were interviewed in accordance with the long-interview methodology in the
above-mentioned neighbourhoods. The interviews were conducted either inside
the respondent’s home or in the street outside the home. No gift or payment was
given to respondents for their participation in the interviews. The questionnaire
was developed by Natasha Heeler, and was first tested in Sam Sam 1 before
being modified to its final version for the remaining neighbourhoods (see Annex).
The interviews were conducted between July 22” and August 29th 2006. They
were conducted by Natasha Heeler as principle interviewer, with guiding and
translation by Ibrahima Gueye fMakumba2) and assistance f rom Amadou FaIl.
Each interview lasted approximately one hour, and about 8 interviews were
conducted per day.
III. 2. i. Interview Bias
An important consideration in any qualitative analysis is that of bias. Some
degree of bias is inevitable. As such, a number 0f sources cf bias in this study
2 Ibrahima Gueye was known to everyone as Makumba. He was referred to me by Malik Coly of the FDV
when I mentioned the need for a guide and interpreter. Makumba was one ot the directors of his local GIE in
Thiaroye.
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were identified. These include bias of sample, bias of responses, and bias of
interpretation. An overview of these and the measures taken to minimize them
follows.
Bias of sample:
The sample of households interviewed was flot random. The selection was
biased due to several reasons including the influence 0f local culture, the
influence of Makumba, and the timing of the interviews.
Local culture usually dictated that neighbourhood leaders and their network of
friends be the first households interviewed (see image 8). Given that sample
sizes in each community was fairly small (the range was betweenl9 and 30
households per community), this distortion was fairly significant. Further, within
each household, the household head, or the available male at the top of the
hierarchy, was self-selected to represent the interests ot the household. This
meant that my sample did flot include interviews with more vulnerable household
members such as non-head women, lodgers or tenants.
Makumba was very well connected within the communities surveyed. While this
was a great benefit in terms of gaining access to communities, it also meant that
the choice of households we entered was influenced by his prior knowledge of
the area and his network of contacts. In some cases Makumba selected
households for personal reasons (i.e. he was friends with a particular household).
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In some cases Makumba selected households for technical reasons (i.e. finding
French-speaking households so that translation was flot needed when he was
otherwise occupied). In other cases he selected households for cultural reasons
(i.e. avoiding households where a woman asking questions might flot be
welcomed).
In terms of timing, interviews were conducted during the daytime, usually
finishing just before evening prayers, on weekdays and on weekends. This
meant that only those who were flot out and active in the day were at home and
available for interviews. I tried to mitigate timing bias by interviewing on different
days of the week, and Makumba even made appointments with some people in
advance.
Bias of responses:
Responses to interviews were biased due to respondents’ reactions to the
interviewer and to their perception of the situation.
It is generally acknowledged in research fields requiring qualitative fieldwork that
the signs a tieldworker gives off such as: locally defined as attractive or flot,
wearing suitable or peculiar clothing, 0f a particular demeanour, height, weight,
age, professional, marital and other credentials, can strongly influence the
responses to an interview (Warren, 2001). As a young white woman, a foreigner
in Senegal, who spoke French, flot Wolof, with respondents, I carried many such
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meaningful signs, some of which I was aware, and some flot, that could result in
biased responses.
Because I was toreign, respondents offen assumed that I represented an
international funding agency. Interview respondents were thus potentially biased
because respondents had their own interests in mmd. For example, if they told
me they were very poor, perhaps more money would be given to the community.
In my initial interviews, several respondents told me about problems, such as
snakes living in the neighbour’s woodpile, that they assumed I could help fix. I
tried to mitigate this potential bias by a. explaining to respondents at the start of
the interview that I was a student doing independent research, and b. by creating
a sidebar on the questionnaire where I could record my impressions of a
respondent’s level of honesty and reaction toward me (see Annex).
In the tive and a half weeks I spent conducting interviews in these
neighbourhoods, I neyer saw another white foreigner after my bus turned off the
highway and went into Pikine. Because my presence in these communities was
so unique (see image 9), my status as a foreigner may also have leU to some
culturally biased responses based on respondent’s assumptions about me.
Having Abdou Tail, a Senegalese maIe, assist with interviewing help to check for
robustness of some of these responses. For example, in Thiaroye Gare, I
checked the difference in responses to me and ta Amadou. I conducted the first
11 interviews and Amadou FaIl conducted the last 13 interviews. There are
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differences in the responses given to myself, Natasha and those give to Amadou
(see figure i). These could be accounted for in part by these sampling
discrepancies (in Natasha’s sample, four respondents were identified as being
important members 0f the community, while in Amadou’s response sample no
one was identified as such), but they could also signal response bias. Both
Natasha’s and Amadou’s samples were otherwise fairly homogenous in terms of
respondent characteristics:.
Image 9: local
children’s reactions
to Natasha as a
foreigner
Image 8: Makumba (centre) with
neighborhood chief in Thiaroye
G are
o
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new house
start a
business
enlarge house
food
child abroad
university
• titIe’ refers to ‘Obtain a legal land title for the house’
• ‘New house’ refers to ‘Buy a new house’
• ‘Enlarge house’ refers to ‘Enlarge! renovate the house to better Iodge the
family’
• ‘Food’ refers to ‘Better food for the family
• ‘child abroad’ corresponds to ‘Send a child abroad’
• ‘university’ refers to ‘Send a child to university’
• “Mecca’ corresponds to ‘Travel to Mecca’
Figure 1: discrepancies between responses to Natasha and Amadou:
title
Mecca
0 5 10 15
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An interesting twist in culturally-biased responses was the reaction respondents
had to me, particularly in Layenne3 households, due to the fact that I lived with a
prominent Senegalese family right next to one of the primary religious sites in
Senegal , the Mosque Layenne. This association seemed to accord me a certain
level of respect. It was something that was mentioned off-the-cuff, in casual
conversation with a respondent, but atter that, Makumba made sure to telI
respondents this information as he introduced me. This association gave me
stature, as did my French-speaking status. Only respondents who had had a
strong level of schooling could respond to me in French, otherwise Makumba
translated. This could have resulted in Wolof-speaking respondents feeling
alienated to me.
As it is key in any qualitative approach is to build trust and to minimize response
bias (Wright and Copestake, 2004), I did my best to respect and integrate into
local customs. For example, I took lessons in Wolof so that I cou Id communicate
somewhat with non-French speaking respondents. I often wore Senegalese
dress (see image 10). I accepted and consumed anything I was given to eat or
drink. I often sat on the floor with respondents during interviews. I developed
personal connections through jokes and casual conversation.
Makumba’s presence was also a source of potential response bias. He was
affiliated with his local GIE and with the FDV. Respondents perhaps knew the
The Layenne community s a branch of the Muslim religion that follows the teachings of a Marabout living
in Yoff-Layenne.
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kind of answers that would please him and the FDV. As he is a welI-known
personality in the area, respondent’s personal relationships with him may have
affected answers as welI.
Image 10: Natasha wearing Sengalese
style clothing, eating lunch with
respondents
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Beyond response biases toward Makumba and myself, there were response
biases toward the types of questions asked and the way they were asked. This
was especially so in the initial interviews. An example cf a biased response to a
question was that at first, most household heads told me that there was no
business at their home. Yet at the same time as one respondent told me this, I
saw his daughter set up a stand to seli donuts she had made in front of their
front door. When I asked him why he did not teli me about this business, ho told
me that her business was just for her own benefit, and he did not really consider
it to be a real business. From this, I Iearned to ask about ail kinds of business,
no matter how small.
Despite these issues, my overail impression is that respondents tried to be as
honest as possible. Many of the questions in the interviews, about finances and
values, touch on very personai topics, but respondents responded without
hesitation. Many even brought out buis, deeds or other officiai documents,
without being asked, to show me that they were teliing me the truth.
Bias cf interpretation
The kinds cf experiences fieldworkers have, the observations they make, and
their transformations cf these experiences and observations into field notes are
inevitably products of their own gendered and embodied relations with
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respondents (Warren, 2001). Any fieldworker searching for sources of bias must
C thus turn the lens on herseif. How did my own perceptions bias the resu Its?
Prior te going to Senegal, I had read fairly extensively about tenure regularisation
programs. I based my first questionnaire on this prior knowledge and on my
assumptions stemming from this. For example, I thought that respondents would
understand the difference between a full legal titie and a DS and I based some of
my questioning on this. In fact, I know that I arrived on the scene thinking that
residents were being deceived with the acquisition cf a DS because this was net
the equivalent cf a full legal titte. In some ot my initial interviews, I tried to engage
with respondents on this point, expecting them to feel outraged like me. I soon
realised that this was helpful neither te the quality of my study nor te my
methodological process. My second questionnaire evolved partly in response to
this self-knowledge.
This was my first foray into extensive fieldwork. It was also my first trip to Atrica
and to Senegal, although by the time I started interviewing I had been living with
a Senegalese family for 7 weeks. In other words, I was very much an outsider.
This made it difficuit for me to evaluate and interpret many things, especially at
the beginning cf the five weeks cf interviewing. For example, over the course cf
my interviews, I came to recognise types cf dress and quality cf furnishings as
signs et wealth and stature or as signs of poverty and vulnerability. Adding te my
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outsider status was the language difference as I could flot pick on subtieties of
C language.
In addition to spending over five weeks, which is a fairly long time, in the
neighbourhoods, travelling in and out on a regular basis using the same forms of
transportation as local people helped to mitigate my outsider perspective. For
example, at first I Ioved the three hours a day that I spent getting in and out of the
neighbourhoods (see images 11 and 12) because it gave me the opportunity to
see and hear SO many things. However, my romance with this wore off after a
few weeks and I began to curse the idea of cramming into a small vehicle in the
heat of the rainy season with 20 other people. This gave me an appreciation for
the frustrations that are part of the daily life of residents of these areas as well as
the marginalisation of these neighbourhoods.
Another example of my outsider notions dominating my perspective occurred
while conducting interviews in Yeumbeul with Makumba. Yeumbeul Layenne has
not undergone a regularisation and upgrading project. Makumba singled out the
narrow, twisting lanes and alleyways between homes in Yeumbeul as both an
eyesore and a fire hazard. This, Makumba seemed to imply, was an example of
the poor quality of life in areas without program intervention. This anecdote
demonstrates Makumba’s bias in favour of program intervention as well as the
strong association of these programs with their urban upgrading component.
More to the point, though, his comment came as a shock to me. Prior to his
$2
comment I had been admiring the whimsical maze patterns of Yeumbeul’s
alleyways. They brought to mmd the human-scale, pedestrian-friendly urban
design ethos so in vogue in North America. Makumba’s comment reminded me
not only of his bias but also cf my own.
Images J J and J 2 heavy traffic and overloaded transportation
for getting in and out of the neighbourhoods
IV Results
IV. 1. Presentation of Resu Its
Interviews were conducted in the Pikine-region neighbourhoods of Sam Sam I,
Thiaroye Gare, Dalifort, Yeumbeul Layenne, Médina Thiaroye Karo 1, Médina
Fass M’Bao, and Aïnoumady between JuIy 22uid and August 29th 2006.
Questionnaires and responses were translated from original French by Natasha
Heeler.
In Sam Sam land Aïnoumady, tenure regularisation and upgrading projects are
ongoing. In Thiaroye Gare, a project recently gotten underway, but had flot yet
reached the whole neighbourhood. In Dalitort and Médina Fass M’Bao projects
had been implemented and were now closed. Yeumbeul Layenne and Médina
Thiaroye Karo 1 are both designated traditional villages, and the land is a
communal property.
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Figure ii Summary of respondent and household characteristics from
questionnaires
Neighbourhood Sam Thiaroye Yeumbeul Dalifort Médina Médina Aïnoumady
Sami Gare Layenne Thiaroye Fass
characteristics Karo 1 M’Bao
Numberof 22 24 19 25 30 30 20
respondents
Respondent is 22/22 24/24 12/19 25/25 30/30 30/30 20/20
head1
MaIe 19/22 22/24 19/19 25/25 28/30 25/30 19/20
respondent
Average 61 62 55 62 58 55 68
respondent
age
Average years 22 35 Born here 20 37 16 30
lived_here
Average 12 15 20 11 13 12 21
household size (compounds) (tenants)
Access to tap n/a 24/24 14/19 25/25 30/30 28/30 19/20
water
Access to n/a 24/24 14/19 25/25 30/30 24/30 19/20
electricity
Access to f ixed nIa 18/24 10/19 19/25 10/30 17/30 12/20
telephone
Partial DS n/a n/a n/a4 2/25 n/a 17/30 9/20
payments
FuIIDS n/a n/a n/a 23/25 n/a 11/30 9/20
A respondent who is not a household head is almost aiways a younger brother of the household
head who lives in the same house.
2 Sam Sam 1 interviews used the f irst version of the questionnaire. Some categories do flot apply.
The regularisation and upgrading program in Thiaroye Gare was new and had only reached haif the
respondents. The number of people with or without a DS in the sample is therefore not necessarily
representative of the neighbourhood.
Yeumbeul Layenne and Médina Thiaroye Karo are otficially recognised as a traditional villages with one
communal property for the community, and therefore no regularisation program.
$5
Figure iii Summary of Respondent’s top three values from questionnaires
(see Second version, Qualitative household questionnaire, Question 1)
(Sam Sam 1 flot included because First Version of Questionnaire was used)
(included in table: top three responses by ranking — tied responses ail included)
Neighbourhood Thiaroye Yeumbeul Dalitort Médina Médina Aïnoumady
Gare Thiaroye Fass
Values Karo 1 M’Bao
Sample size 24 19 25 30 30 20
Goodfood 3 3
education 2 3 3 1
security 3 3
Stable income 1 2 2 1 1
Well lit, clean 3 1 2 2 2
Large house 1 3
medical
services
Helping_others
• ‘good food’ corresponds to ‘Having access to good quality food’
• ‘education’ corresponds to ‘Having access to a good education for the
children’
• ‘security’ corresponds to ‘Having security of housing/property’
• ‘stable income’ corresponds to ‘Having a stable source of revenue for the
family’
• ‘well lit, clean’ corresponds to ‘b live in a neighbourhood that is weli lit
and well drained’
• ‘large house’ refers to ‘having a house that can shelter ail my family’
• ‘medical expenses’ refers to ‘having enough tunds to pay for ail medial
prescriptions’
• ‘services’ refers to ‘having access to services/utilities: water, electricity,
telephone’
• ‘helping others’ refers to ‘having the means to give money to the less
fortunate of my tamily’
Overail top three responses:
1. ‘Having a stable source of revenue for the famiiy’
2. ‘To live in a neighbourhood that is well lit and weli drained’
3. ‘Having access to a good education for the children’
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Figure iv Summary of Respondent’s top three dreams from questionnaires
(see Second version, Qualitative household questionnaire, Question 2)
(Sam Sam 1 not inciuded because First Version of Questionnaire was used)
(included in table: top three responses plus ‘Mecca’
— tied responses ail included)
Neighbourhood Thiaroye Yeumbeu Dalifort Médina Médina Aïnoumady
Gare Thiaroye Fass
Dreams Karo 1 M’Bao
Sample size 24 19 25 30 30 20
Mecca 8 8 79 78 78 72
Child abroad 3 1 2 2 2 3
Work on house 1 1 1 3 1 1
title 2 2 1 3 3
Start business 2 3
New_house
Fix for tenants 3
Bankaccount 3 3
Goodfood 3
health 2
• ‘Mecca’ corresponds to ‘Travel to Mecca’
• ‘child abroad’ corresponds to ‘Send a chilU abroad’
• ‘Work on house’ corresponds to ‘Enlarge? renovate the house to beffer
lodge the family’
• ‘title’ refers to ‘Obtain a legal land title for the house’
• ‘start business’ refers to ‘start a business’
• ‘new house’ refers to ‘Buy a new house’
• ‘Fix for tenants’ refers to ‘Enlarge the house to house tenants’
• ‘bank account’ refers to ‘open a bank account’
• ‘good food’ refers to ‘Setter food for the family’
• ‘health expenses’ refers to ‘Health expenditures’
Overall top three responses fexcluding ‘Mecca’):
1. ‘En large? renovate the house to beffer lodge the family’
2. ‘Send a child abroad’
3. ‘Obtain a legal land titie for the house’
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IV. 1.1 SamSam 1
(First version of the questionnaire)
Tenure regularïsation and upgrading program status: ongoing, since 1992
Number of interviews: 22 households interviewed
Description of Respondents:
• Head-of-household: Ail
• Sex: 19 male; 3 female (In ail three female cases, husband had been
previous head of household but had dieU.)
• Age: range: 33 to 78; average: 61, mean: 65
• Length of time Iïved in neighbourhood: range: 9 to 34 years (none born
here); average: 22 years
• Originally from: Other parts of Dakar: 72; Other parts of Pikine: 7;
countryside villages: 3
(reasons for moving here: previously was a renter so came to the area to
purchase a house; family house got too crowded so moved out; was evicted from
previous home; child was sick 50 solU more expensive home elsewhere and
bought cheaper house here)
Description of Households:
• Number of people: range: 7 to 35; average: 12
• Number of chiidren under 15: range: O to 8; average: 5
• Number of adults: range: 2 to 13; average: 8
• Types of famïly structure: one husband, one wife, children: 15 (with 1 to
3 wives living elsewhere in about haif the cases); other: one husband and
2 to 3 wives in same house: 4, maternaI family
Work of the Household:
• Number of adults who work: range: O to 4; average: 2
(reasons for not working: industry shut down, Ioss of job, sickness/disease, age,
had business but it went into bankruptcy)
$8
Types of work:
Most common: informai sector trade: 10 (mason, mechanic, electrician,
weider, guard, driver, apprenticeship) and informai sector business: 6
(market stail seller (otten women), seiiing auto parts, trade with Cassamance,
teiecentre, tailor/seamstress, renting rooms to tenants, seiling seif-cooked
Street food);
Uncommon: formai sector trade: 4 (Nestié, hotei employee, military, and a
Municipal Counsellor); other income: pension, child abroad
Tenure Status:
• Status of process for obtaining DS: No payments made: 3; less than a
quarter cf payments made: 6; one quarter or more: 10; fully paid: 3
• Length of payment process: Most households had been making
payments for a period between 2 and 6 years.
• Method of saving for DS: Most household heads said they paid for DS
on their own without famiiy help, in order to avoid internai famiiy confiict
and because it is the Senegaiese tradition.
• Comments about DS payments: The price seems reasonabie but I have
no means to pay. I couid pay if I had a steady job. There are peopie who
reaiiy cannot pay, especiaiiy retired peopie, and this creates inequaiities in
the community.
• Why a OS is wanted:
Three most common responses: to leave a soiid Iegacy for ail my heirs; to
have protection trom being harassed or evicted by the state, for my peace cf
mmd.
Other responses: to ïncrease the value of my house; to feel safe investing in
my house; I have already Iived through a forced eviction and want to avoid
that now; it is normai and necessary to have proper papers for one’s
property; it is an honour for the father of a famiiy; to obtain a guarantee for
accessing bans for my business (I have no other guarantee in my life)
because the state is powerful and when it asks us to do something we
shouid do it as a good citizen, to use it to get jobs for my chiidren or to send a
child abroad
• Reasons for not paying: divisive famiiy issues; barely enough money for
food.
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• Additional question (asked of some respondents): do you know any
neighbours who have obtained a DS, and how have their lives changed
because of this?: Several respondents answered yes and said those with
a DS had improved their houses. Several answered no.
Spending and Finances:
• Percentages and amounts of spendïng:
bigqest expense: tood
expenses not on the list but mentioned by numerous respondents: medical
expenses (malaria, diabetes, fatigue, childbirth) up to 25 000 CFA per month;
ceremonies and guests; giving money to less fortunate relatives
• Access to a bank account: Only respondents with jobs in the formai
sector had bank accounts. Other respondents, even those with profitable
businesses, said it was too expensive. Some retirees had previously
owned bank accounts. Almost no one had used the account for accessing
credit or bans. The one respondent who said he had used credit was a
municipal officer for Pikine. He had used credit to clean and enlarge his
house. Reasons given for not accessing credit or bans were: age (too
old); dishonour associated with going into debt; fear of risk.
• Additïonal question (asked of some respondents): what would you do if
you had a lot of money? Most frequent response: home improvements i.e.
enlarging house, building a proper roof; repairing house from flood
damage, buying TV and beds. Other responses: health expenditures;
have more wives; start or invest in a business; pilgrimage to Mecca; get
jobs for chibdren; use it to make more money; open a bank account to
keep money safely.
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IV. J. ii. Thiaroye Gare
(Second version 0f the questionnaire)
Tenure regularisatïon and upgradïng program status: About haif the
households were in an area that had been reached by the regularisation project.
Number of interviews: 24 households interviewed (originally 25 but one
interview was cut off by respondent after first question, so real total = 24)
Description of Respondents:
• Head-of-household: Ail
• Sex: 22 male; 2 female
• Age: range: 31 to 85; average: 62, mean: 62
• Length of time lived in neighbourhood: moyeU here between 1966 and
1976 (35 years)
• Originallyfrom: Guédiawaye, Pikine, Dakar
(reasons for moving here: Most common reason: previously was a renter so
came to the area to purchase a house; other: family house got too crowded 50
moved out; was evicted from previous home; father at nearby military base;
father worked at local factory)
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Descrïption of va’ues:
What are the 3 elements from the following list that, according to you, can
contribute the most to your quality of life? (see Annex)
Five most frequent answers:
Figure y: Values of Respondents in Thiaroye Gare
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• good food’ corresponds to ‘Having access to good quality food’
• ‘education’ corresponds to ‘Having access to a good education for the
ch i Id ren’
•
‘security’ corresponds to ‘Having security of housing/property’
• ‘stable income’ corresponds to ‘Having a stable source of revenue for the
family’
• ‘well lit, clean’ corresponds to ‘To live in a neighbourhood that is well lit
and well drained’
Comments: The other answers were distributed fairly evenly (3 or 4 responses
good food education security stable income well lit, clean
each).
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Description of dreams/ objectives:
If you had a lot of money, what would be your 3 priorities from the following list
Five most frequent answers (two are tied):
Figure vi: Dreams of Respondents in Thiaroye Gare
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• ‘Mecca’ corresponds to ‘Travel to Mecca’
• ‘child abroad’ corresponds to Send a chiid abroad’
• ‘work on house’ corresponds to ‘Enlarge/ renovate the house to better
Iodge the family’
• ‘titie’ refers to ‘Obtain a legal land titie for the house’
• ‘new house’ refers to ‘Buy a new house’
• ‘start business’ refers to ‘start a business’
Description of Households:
Number of people: range: 9 to 23; average: 75
• Types of family structure: Most common: one husband, one wife,
chiidren; other: one husband and 2 to 3 wives in same house, maternai
famiiy, a couple households with one or two wives living eisewhere.
• Number of bedrooms: range: 4 to 12
Mecca chiid work on titie new start
abroad house house business
• Services: water and electricity: 24, tixed telephone: 18
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• Building: Ail homes were seif-built over a number of years, and many
were having rooms added at the time. House-building was an ongoing
process.
Ownership and security:
• Status of house ownership: Ail respondents said that they own their
house
Ownership documents: Most common: Deed of sale from prevlous
owner. Others: family or customary property.
• Amount paid: vacant lot: 33000 to 43000 CFA (1960s and 1970s)
• Importance of being an owner flot a renter: Ail said that it was very
important to own a house and flot to refit. Reasons: most common: it is
very expensive to refit. Other reasons: being an owner gives you freedom
in life. Owning a home is the dream of ail heads of households. Property
gives a social status. Owning property protects against an uncertain
future. I used to be a renter and I was robbed.
• Threat of evïction: AIl respondents said that they did flot fear eviction.
Reasons for this were that it is a traditionai village, and the village is
sacred and untouchable.
• Who wiii inherit the house: ail said that their children, or wives and
chiidren would inherit.
• Comments:
One household head had been forced to leave his home due to extensive
flooding damage from the previous year. He was currently renting 2 rooms for his
9-member family. He had been told that he would be relocated to government
subsidized housing in Keur-Massar, but he had been given no timeline (a year
had already passed) and his only source of information was from newspapers.
He said that he had flot been able to pay for the previous month’s refit.
Work of the Household:
• Num ber 0f aduits who work: range: 3 to 8
(reasons for flot working: sickness/disease, age, had business but it went into
bankruptcy or had trouble with my partners)
• Types of work:
Most common: informai sector: trade (mason, mechanic, eiectrician, driver etc.)
and informai sector business (selling street food or market vendor (wives and
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sisters), taiior/seamstress, small store in house or rentai of street-facing rooms
as stores);
Less common: formai sector (working for NGO, municipal agent, teacher,
comptroiler, secretary, factory worker, private sector)
• Other income sources: Very common: family member working abroad
(France, ltaly, United States) pension, renting out another property,
donations from tamily and community network.
Tenure Status:
• Status of process for obtaining DS: Process started but no payments
made: 3; Iess than hait of payments made: 10; aIl payments made: 0.
About hait the households were in an area that had flot yet been reached
by the project.
• Length of payment process: Most households had been making
payments for a period between 1 and 3 years.
• Outcomes (positive and negative) of a DS: Long-term security for
famiiy, protection from the state, gives value to the property, good roads
are buiit in the community. No negative outcomes were listed
• Reasons for flot paying: insufficient means
Spending and Finances:
• Percentages and amounts of spending: food is biggest expense
foiiowed by eiectricity then water. Other expenses not iisted are medical
prescriptions, clothing, family, schooling (10 familles with chiidren in
private school) and ceremonies
• Who contributes to spending: Most common: head of household, other
responses: famiiy abroad contrïbutes
• Who makes decisions on spending: HeaU or head in consultation with
brothers; allocate household funds to wives or sister to make purchases.
• Access to a bank account: Only respondents with jobs in the formai
sector had bank accounts. They do not use this to access credit. Those
with accounts are resources for the community: family members abroad of
neighbours deposit money in their accounts to hold for local familles.
Those without accounts comment that their money disappears so fast
once they have it that an account wouid serve no purpose.
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Women: about haif the households said that their wives or sisters are
involved in local tontines5. The only people cited by household heads as
accessing credit or needing credit were wives and daughters in order to
send a child abroad or to build their business.
A tontine s a group of women (10 — 30) who pool together money through regular (monthly) contributions.
The tunds collected each month are distributed te the member who needs this te pay for a wedding, for
childbirth, and other large expenses.
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IV. 1. iii Dalifort
(Second version 0f the questionnaire)
Tenure regularisation and upgrading program status: Tenure regularisation
and upgrading program since 1987.
Number of interviews: 25 househoids interviewed
Description of Respondents:
• Head-of-household: Ail
• Sex: Ail maie
• Age: range: 46 to 80; average: 62, mean: 64
• Length of time Iived in neighbourhood: Year of arrivai in
neighbourhood: range: 1963 to 1995
Figure vii: Year of Arrivai in Dalifort
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(reasons for moving to Daiifort: Virtuaiiy ail respondents had previousiy been
renters in another area cf Dakar, and had corne to Daiifort to purchase affordabie
property)
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Description of values:
What are the 3 elements from the following list that, according to you, can
contribute the most to your quality 0f life?
Five most frequent answers:
Figure viii: Values of Respondents in Dalifort
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• security 0f property’ corresponds to ‘Having security of housing/property’
• ‘well lit, clean’ corresponds to ‘b live in a neighbourhood that is well lit
and well drained’
• ‘helping others’ refers to ‘having the means to give money to the less
fortunate ot my family’
• ‘education’ corresponds to ‘Having access to a good education for the
ch i Id ren’
• ‘stable income’ corresponds to ‘Having a stable source of revenue for the
family’
security well lit, clean helping education stable
others
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Description of dreams/ objectives:
If you had lots of money, what would be your 3 priorities from the following list:
Five most frequent answers (25 respondents):
Figure ix: Dreams of Respondents in Dalifort
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• ‘Mecca’ corresponds to ‘Travel to Mecca’
• ‘child abroad’ corresponds to ‘Send a child abroad’
• ‘work on house’ corresponds to ‘Enlarge! renovate the house to better
Iodge the family’
• ‘bank account’ refers to ‘Open a bank account’
• ‘health’ refers to ‘Health expenditures’
Description of Households:
Number of people: range: 5 to 19, average: 11
• Types of family structure: husband, one wife and children: 14; husband,
two wives and children: 10; husband, 3 wives and chiidren: J
Mecca child abroad work on bank account health
house
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(3 households with other wives living elsewhere)
• Number of bedrooms: range: 4 to 8
• Services: Ail: water and electricity; 19: telephone
• Building: Ail homes were self-built. Most had been upgraded from
previous wooden shack state to brick building.
Ownership and security:
• Status of house ownership: Ail heads said that they owned the property.
• Ownership documents: 18 stated that they bought the land from a
previous owner, and afterward paid for the DS (see comments beiow). For
example, one such household arrived in 1987 and paid the previous
owner 400 000, then from 1992 to 1997 he paid another 400 000 CFA to
obtain the DS.
• Importance of beïng an owner not a renter: AIl said that it was very
important to own a house and not to rent. Reasons: AIl had previously
been renters, and had had negative experiences as renters. Renting was
said to be expensive, unstable, not peaceful, and a hardship.
• Threat of eviction: Eviction is not a threat.
• Who will inherit the house: Children, or wives and chiidren will inherit.
• Comments: 7 properties purchased from Demba Diop in 1970s and early
1 980s. Prices ranged from 60 000 CFA to 250 000 CFA. 6 properties were
purchased from Mamadou Diop in the late 1980s. Prices ranged from 150
000 CFAto 600 000 CFA.
Work of the Household:
• Types of work: Heads of households: 13 were receiving pensions,
indicating previous employment in the formai sector. 4 currently working in
formai sector: 3 at the Port, 1 for an NGO. Others worked in informai as
mechanics, electricians, masons, plumbers, and painters. 10 said that a
female mem ber of the househoid soid food or fabric on the street.
Tenure Status:
• Status of process for obtaining OS: Process started but no payments
made: 0; partial payment made: 2 ; ail payments made: 23.
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• Length of payment process: Most households started payments in 1991
and obtained a DS between 1999 and 2002.
• Method of paying for DS: 20: saved money by myself. 4: Family saved
money together. 1: tontine.
• Outcomes (positive and negatïve) of a DS: Happiness, social peace,
economic stability, no fear of eviction, relief from burden of paying rent,
access to credit (2 respondents, one of whom had obtained credit for his
business). No negative outcomes were listed.
Spending and Finances:
• Percentages and amounts of spending: food is biggest expense
followed by electricity then water.
• Who contrïbutes to spending: Most common: head of household, other
responses: family
• Who makes decisions on spending: Head or head in consultation with
family
• Access to a bank account: 2 respondents said they had bank accounts.
• Women: about half the households said that their wives or sisters are
involved in local tontines. The only people cited by household heads as
needing credit were wives and daughters who wanted b send a child
abroad or to build their business.
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IV. 1. ivYeumbeul Layenne
(Second version of the questionnaire)
Tenure regularisatïon and upgrading program status: no regularisation
program. This community, a traditional village, is a communal property.
Number of interviews: 19 households interviewed
Description 0f Respondents:
• Head-of-household: 12, others are younger brothers, Sons or sons-in-Iaw
of household head
• Sex: Ail male
• Age: range: 40 to 76; average: 55, mean: 58
• Length of time Iived in neighbourhood: most born here or nearby, one
came to neighbourhood after being expropriated 30 years ago.
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Description of values:
What are the 3 elements from the following list that, according to you, can
contribute the most to your quality 0f lite?
Six most frequent answers, ail respondents:
Figure x:values of Respondents in Yeumbeul Layenne
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‘good food’ corresponds to ‘Having access to good quality food’
• ‘services’ refers to ‘having access to services/utilities: water, electricity,
teiephone’
• ‘large house’ refers to ‘having a house that can shelter ail my family’
• ‘education’ corresponds to ‘Having access to a good education for the
children’
• ‘stable income’ corresponds to ‘Having a stable source of revenue for the
family’
• ‘medicai expenses’ refers to ‘having enough funds to pay for ail medial
prescriptions’
Comments: Discrepancies between non-head respondents and head
respondents: 6/7 non-head respondents said that they value ‘having enough
funds to pay for ail medial prescriptions’ whereas only 1/12 head respondents
did. Responses between these two groups are otherwise similar.
good food services large house education stable medical
income expenses
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o Description of dreamsl oblectives:
If you had lots cf money, what would be your 3 priorities from the following Iist:
Five most frequent answers (19 respondents, two are tied):
Figure xi: Dreams of Respondents in Yeumbeul Layenne
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• ‘Mecca’ corresponds to ‘Travel to Mecca’
• ‘child abroad’ corresponds to ‘Send a child abroad’
• ‘work on house’ corresponds to ‘Enlarge! renovate the house to better
lodge the tamily’
• ‘start business’ refers to ‘start a business’
• ‘title’ refers to ‘Obtain a legal land title for the hou se’
Comments: Discrepancies between non-head respondents and head
respondents: 4/7 non-head respondents indicated ‘send a child to university’ as a
top three objective, whereas 0/12 head respondents indicated so. 1/7 non-head
respondents indicated ‘Obtain a legal land title for the house’ was a top-three
objective, whereas 6/12 head respondents said it was.
Mecca child abroad work on start title
house business
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C Description of Households:
• Number of people: range: 7 to 56; average: 20 (these households are in
the style cf family compounds, often with several structures around a
common courtyard)
• Types of family structure: Most common: one husband, one wife,
chiidren; other: one husband and 2 to 3 wives in same house, a couple
households with one or two wives living elsewhere (one such wife had
been the wife of the respondent’s deceased brother. He married her as a
form cf “social protection”)
• Number 0f bedrooms: range: 2 to 8
• Services: Most had access to water and electricity. Some had been shut
off due to non-payment. Some access utilities through the cheaper black
market.
• Building: Ail homes were self-built. Many had been fixed by more recent
generations who had renovated wooden structures into brick.
Ownershïp and securïty:
• Status of house ownership: Ail heads said that they owned the property.
(Head of Koranic school, who is renting, is exception. See comments
below).
• Ownershïp documents: Almost ail heads said that they had no papers
for their property since they had traditional/customary rights to the land.
(One respondent has a full legal title. See comments below.)
• Importance of beïng an owner flot a renter: Ail said that it was very
important to own a house and not to rent. Reasons: No one wants to be a
renter. I would rather live in a garbage dump than be a renter.
• Threat of evictïon: Eviction is not a threat. Respondents said that they
feel safe because they live in a traditional village.
• Who wïll inherit the house: Children, or wives and chiidren wili inherit.
• Comments: 1. Several non-head respondents own parceis of vacant land
and would like to build their own houses there. 2. Head of Koranic school
rents his property for his own family and 32 students. He had been in this
location one year; his previous location was flooded out. The school was
in terrible condition, with no electricity or telephone, and the water tap
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locked due to lack of payment. A large percentage of students had
O sicknesses and almost ail had malaria (source: school documents). 3. Onenon-head held a full legai property titie.
Work of the Household:
Types of work: Most common: informai sector: trade (mason,
mechanic, electrician, driver, ) and informai sector business (selling
street food or market vendor (wives and sisters), tailor/seamstress, small
store in house or rentai of street-facing rooms as stores, some mid-size
businesses); formai sector: pensions, miiitary, business, factory
• Other income sources: 8 respondents said that they cuitivated at ieast
one field nearby (one fieid had been fiooded and filied with sait water so
was currentiy unusable)
Tenure Status:
Ail of Yeumbeul-Layenne is registered as one communal property and it is
considered by the state to be a traditional village.
• Status of process for obtaining DS: There is no tenure regularisation
project underway here as it is a communal land holding. One respondent
(the eldest son of the chief of Dakar’s Lébou community) had separated
his lot in the cadastre and obtained a full legai titie, flot a DS, for his plot.
• Outcomes (positive and negative) of a DS: Ail respondents, both non
head and head, said that a titie was a positive thing. Many aspired to
acquire one. 5 non-head respondents said that they were trying to
purchase their own plot of land eisewhere. Head respondents said that
they wanted a titie for their properly to leave something secure for their
chiidren. One had asked to have his own plot separated from the
communal plot so that he could have his own individual titie, but he was
toid that it was very expensive to do so and that the state would neyer
evict them from their communal land.
Spending and Finances:
• Percentages and amounts of spending: food is biggest expense
followed by electricity then water. Other expenses flot iisted are medicai
prescriptions, clothing, ceremonies, schooling.
• Who contributes to spending: Non-head respondents: said that they pay
for their nuclear family, but that head makes decisions for ail.
• Who makes decisions on spending: Head or head in consultation with
brothers; allocate household funds to wives or sister to make purchases.
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• Access to a bank account: Two non-head respondents had bank
accounts for the purpose cf saving money to purchase their own property.
2 head respondents said that they had an account and had used it ta
access bans cf 150 0000 CFA for their businesses. 6 households
indicated that they participated in a tontine. Others said that they did flot
have accounts but that access to capital would help them ta grow their
business or invest in their fields. For example, one man with a welding
shop with about 10 employees said that he could flot process large orders
due ta lack cf capital. Several said they would like ta have an accouflt but
it was toc expensive: “it is better that my family eats and dresses webl than
ta have a bank account’. Others said that the amount of capital available
through microcredit programs was not sufficient ta make a difference in
their business.
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IV. 1. V: Médina Thiaroye Karo 1
(Second version ot the questionnaire)
Tenure regularisation and upgradïng program status: no regularisation
program. This community, a traditional village, is a communal property.
Number of interviews: 30 households interviewed
Description of Respondents:
• Head-of-household: Ail
• Sex: 28 male, 2 female
• Age: range: 47 to 82; average: 58, mean: 61
• Length of time Iived in neighbourhood: Year of arrivai in
neighbourhood: range: 1962 to 2001 (one of the two female respondents
arrived in 2001 after a divorce)
Figure xii: Year of Arrivai in Médina Thiaroye Karo
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(reasons for moving to Médina Thiaroye Karo: Virtualiy ail respondents had
previously been renters in nearby neighbourhoods of Yeumbeul, Guédiawaye
and Thiaroye).
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Description of values:
What are the 3 elements from the foliowing list that, according to you, can
contribute the most to your quality of life?
Five most frequent answers: (30 respondents, 3 choices each)
Figure xiii: Values of Respondents in Médina Thiaroye Karo
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(three answers are lied)
• ‘security’ corresponds to ‘Having security of housing/properly’
• ‘well lit, clean’ corresponds to ‘To live in a neighbourhood that is well lit
and weIl drained’
• ‘heiping others’ refers to ‘having the means to give money to the less
fortunate of my family’
• ‘education’ corresponds to ‘Having access to a good education for the
chiidren’
• ‘stable income’ corresponds to ‘Having a stable source of revenue for the
family’
• ‘large house’ refers to ‘Having a house that can shelter ail my tamily’
• ‘services’ refers 10 ‘Having access to services/utilities: water, electricity,
telephone’
security well lit, helping education stable large services
clean others income house
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Description of dreams/ oblectives:
If you had lots of money, what would be your 3 priorities f rom the following Iist:
Five most frequent answers: (30 respondents, 3 choices each)
Figure xiv: Dreams of Respondents in Médina Thiaroye Karo
• ‘Mecca’ corresponds to ‘Travel to Mecca’ ‘health’ refers to ‘Health
expenditures’
• ‘child abroad’ corresponds to ‘Send a child abroad’
• ‘work on house’ corresponds to ‘Enlarge! renovate the house to better
Iodge the family’
• ‘fix for tenants’ refers to ‘Enlarge the house to house tenants’
• ‘title’ refers to Obtain a legal land titie for the house’
o
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Mecca child abroad work on house fix for tenants titie
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Description of Households:
• Number of people: range: 5 to 20, average: 13 (the two families with
women heads were the two smallest with oniy 5 members)
• Types of famïly structure: husband, one wife and chiidren: 12; husband,
two wives and chiidren: li; husband, 3 wives and chiidren: 5; 2 female
headed households: one is second wife of husband who lives elsewhere,
other is recently divorced.
• Number of bedrooms: range: 3 to 16
• Services: Ail: water and electricity; 10: telephone
u
• Building: Ail homes were self-built. Most had been empty plots when
households arrived.
Ownership and security:
• Status of house ownership: Ail heads said that they owned the property.
• Ownershîp documents: Ail had bought plots from a previous owner and
had Acts of sale. The previous owners were ail different. They had paid 15
0000 to 50 000 CFA upon purchase of empty plot (1960s).
• Importance of being an owner flot a renter: 27 households had
previously been renters and had moved here in order to buy. They ail said
that renting caused problems, was expensive and uncerlain.
• Who will inherit the house: Chiidren, or wives and children will inherit.
Work of the Household:
Types of work: pensions very common, otherwise informai trade (mason,
electrician) or business (street selling)
Tenure Status:
• Status of process for obtaining DS: This is a traditionai village, with no
reguiarisation program in place
Spending and Finances:
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Percentages and amounts of spendïng: food is biggest expense
followed by electricity then water.
• Who contrïbutes to spending: Most common: head of household, other
responses: family
• Who makes decisïons on spendïng: Head or head in consultation with
family
• Access to a bank account: 3 respondents said they had a bank account.
Several retired respondents said that they used to have an account when
they worked.
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IV. 1. vii: Médina Fass Mbao
(Second version of the questionnaire)
Tenure regularisation and upgrading program status Progam concluded
Number of interviews: 30 househoids interviewed
Description of Respondents:
• Head-of-household: Ail
• Sex: 25 maie, 5 female
Age: range: 31 to 82; average: 55 , mean: 55
• Length of time Iived in neighbourhood:
neighbourhood: range: 1967 to 2000
Figure xv: Year of Arrivai in Médina Fass Mbao:
Year of arrivai in
(reasons for moving to Médina Fass Mbao: 26 respondents had previously been
renters in nearby neighbourhoods of Yeurnbeui, Guédiawaye, Thiaroye and
Pikine. Two (both 46 years olU) said that they had been previousiy been iiving
and working abroad. One had corne from western Senegai to live close to his
children, and one had previously iived in his liffie brother’s house.
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Description of values:
What are the 3 elements from the following Iist that, according to you, can
contribute the most to your quality of lite?
Five most trequent answers: (30 respondents, 3 choices each, 2 tied)
Figure xvi: Values of Respondents in Médina Fass Mbao
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• ‘good food’ refers to ‘Having access to good quality food’
• ‘security’ corresponds to ‘Having security of housing/properly’
• ‘well lit, clean’ corresponds to ‘To live in a neighbourhood that is well lit
and well drained’
• ‘education’ corresponds to ‘Having access to a good education for the
children’
• ‘stable income’ refers to ‘Having a stable source of revenue for the family’
• ‘helping others’ refers to ‘Having the means to give money to the less
fortunate ot my family’
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Description of dreams/ objectives:
If you had lots of money, what would be your 3 priorities from the following Iist:
Five most trequent answers: (30 respondents, 3 choices each, 4 tied)
Figure xvii: Dreams 0f Respondents in Médina Fass Mbao
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• ‘Mecca’ corresponds to ‘Travel to Mecca’ ‘health’ refers to ‘Health
expenditures’
• ‘child abroad’ corresponds to ‘Send a child abroad’
• ‘work on house’ corresponds to ‘Enlarge! renovate the house to better
Iodge the family’
• ‘titie’ refers to ‘Obtain a legal land titie for the house’
• ‘start a business’ refers to ‘start a business’
• ‘Fix for tenants’ refers to ‘Enlarge the house to house tenants’
• ‘bank account’ refers to ‘open a bank account’
Mecca child work on titie start a fix for bank
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Description of Households:
• Number of people: range: 3 to 33, average: 72 (the five famHies with
women heads were among the smallest)
• Types of family structure: husband, one wife and children: 8; husband,
two wives and children: 10; husband, 3 wives and chiidren: 6; husband,
four wives and children: 1; 5 female-headed households, one is widow,
one’s husband is sick.
• Number of bedrooms: range: 2 to 9
• Services: 28: water, 24: electricity; 77: telephone (2 households with no
services! utilities: one headed by 80-year oid woman, and the other
headed by 40 year old man with three wives and one child. The other
women-headed households had water but flot phone or electricity.)
• Building: Ail homes were self-built. Most had been empty plots when
households arrived.
Ownership and security:
• Status of house ownership: Ail heads said that they owned the property.
• Ownership documents: Ail had bought plots from a previous owner and
had Acts of sale dating mostiy from the 1960s They had moyeU out of
family homes nearby..
• Importance of being an owner flot a renter: Many households had
previously been renters and had moyeU here in order to buy. They were
ail very negative about renting.
• Who wiii inherit the house: Children, or wives and chiidren will inherit.
Work of the Househoid:
• Types of work: 9 heads with formai jobs as businessmen, teachers and
factory workers.7 heads with pensions. 9heads in informai trade and 5 in
informai business. Many wives or daughters were vendors at local
markets.
Tenure Status:
• Status of process for obtaining OS: Process starled but no payments
made: 2; partial payment made: 17 ; ail payments made: 11
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• Accessing credit: None of the DS-holders had used it to access credit.
• Length of payment process: Households started payments in 1995,
1998, or 2001. (Those who had DS received it in 2002 or 2003).
• Method of paying for DS: Most said they saved on their own. One
respondent who worked in formai sector said he paid using credit. One
had family abroad who paid.
• Outcomes (positîve and negative) of a DS: Those with a DS cited
increased security and happiness. Those working toward DS hoped to
increase social security.
Spending and Finances:
• Percentages and amounts of spending: food is biggest expense
followed by electricity then water.
• Who contributes to spending: Most common: head of household, other
responses: ail family
• Who makes decisions on spending: Head or head in consultation with
family or wife
• Access to a bank account: 5 respondents said they had a bank account
and used it for saving (to rebuild and repair house, to buy new house).
One had accessed credit to help purchase the DS.
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IV. 1. vi: Aïnoumady Thiaroye
(Second version of the questionnaire)
Tenure regularisation and upgrading program status: Ongoing
Number of interviews: 20 households interviewed
Descriptïon of Respondents:
• Head-of-household: Ail
• Sex: 19 male, 1 female
• Age: range: 54 to 82; average: 68, mean: 67
• Length of tïme iïved in neighbourhood: Year of arrivai in
neighbourhood: range: 1962 to 1995
Figure x iii:Year of Arrivai in Aïnoumady Thiaroye:
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(reasons for moving to Aïnoumady Thiaroye: Virtually ail respondents had
previously been renters in nearby neighbourhoods of Yeumbeul, Guédiawaye
and Pikine. Two said that they had previously been living in another famiiy
member’s house (father-in-law, brother)).
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Description of values:
What are the 3 elements from the foliowing Iist that, according to you, can
contribute the most to your quality of life?
Five most frequent answers: (20 respondents, 3 choices each, 3 are tied)
Figure xix: Values of Respondents in Aïnoumady Thiaroye
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• ‘security’ corresponds to ‘Having security of housing/property’
• ‘well lit, clean’ corresponds to ‘To live in a neighbourhood that is well lit
and well drained’
• ‘medical expenses’ refers to ‘Having enough funds to pay for ail medial
prescriptions’
• ‘education’ corresponds to ‘Having access 10 a good education for the
ch i Id ren’
• ‘large house’ refers to ‘Having a house that can shelter ail my family’
• ‘good food’ refers to ‘Having access b good quaiity food’
security well lit, medical education large house good food
clean expenses
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• ‘Mecca’ corresponds to ‘Travel to Mecca’ ‘health’ refers to ‘Health
expenditures’
• ‘child abroad’ corresponds to ‘Send a child abroad’
• ‘work on house’ corresponds to ‘Enlarge! renovate the house to better
Iodge the family’
• ‘title’ refers to ‘Obtain a legal land titie for the house’
• ‘health expenses’ refers to ‘Health expenditures’
• ‘good food’ refers to ‘Beffer food for the family’
Description of dreamsl obiectives:
O If you had lots of money, what would be your 3 priorities from the foHowing Iist:
Five most frequent answers: (20 respondents, 3 choices each, some tied)
Figure xx: Dreams of Respondents in Aïnoumady Thiaroye
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Descriptïon of Households:
• Number of people: range: 6 to 41 (several larger househoids have 6 —
12 tenants)
• Types of family structure: husband, one wife and children: 12; husband,
two wives and children: 71; husband, 3 wives and chiidren: 5; 2 female
headed households: one is second wife of husband who lives elsewhere,
other is recently divorced.
• Number of bedrooms: 3 to 9
• Services: 19: water, 79: eiectricity; 12: telephone
• Building: Ail homes were self-built. Most had been empty plots when
households arrived.
Ownershïp and securïty:
• Status of house ownership: Ail heads said that they owned the property.
• Ownership documents: Ail had bought plots from a previous owner and
had Acts of sale. There were several previous owners, but one,
Bougouma Pouye, sold 7 of the 20 plots. in the 1960s and 1970s they had
15 000 CFA to 25 000 CFA upon purchase of empty plot.
• Importance of being an owner flot a renter: 18 households had
previously been renters and had moyeU here in order to buy. They were
ail very negative about renting, saying, for example, that it is hard to raise
children properly as a tenant as you have no control, that it is impossible
to keep your own family’s “dirty laundry” secret as a renter, and that once
you are an owner, you pay one time and that is it.
• Who wili inherit the house: Chiidren, or wives and chiidren will inherit.
Work of the Househoid:
• Types of work: 3 heads with formai jobs as businessmen, teachers and
machinists.12 heads with pensions. Some informai trade and some
informai businesses, notably 4 in-home tailors, and 4 with tenants. Many
said that their wives sold food at the local market.
Tenure Status:
• Status of process for obtainïng OS: Process started but no payments
made: 2 (reasons cited: head is sick and has no means of paying; family
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council must tirst meet and decide how to pay); partial payment made: 9;
O ail payments made: 9 (4 had received the DS and 5 were awaiting theofficiai ceremony, scheduled for 2007, to be awarded the DS).
• Accessing credit: None of the DS-holders had used it to access credit.
• Length of payment process: Most households started payments in 1992.
Those who had a DS had obtained it in 2002.
• Method of paying for DS: 16: saved by myself; 4: myself and my chiidren
• Outcomes (positive and negative) of a DS: Those with a DS cited
increased security and stability, and said that renting had been a hardship.
Some saw ownership as a way to save money and avoid costly rent. One
or two mentioned access to credit. A couple respondents said that the
state was forcing this process on them. They had to submit to the wili of
the state or be faced with problems.
Spending and Finances:
• Percentages and amounts of spending: food is biggest expense
foliowed by electricity then water.
• Who contributes to spendïng: Most common: head of household; other
resiDonses: ail family
• Who makes decisions on spending: HeaU or head in consultation with
family or son
• Access to a bank account: 7 respondents said they had a bank account
and used it for saving (to rebuild and repair house, to buy new house).
Other respondents without accounts laughed at the suggestion, saying
that owning an account was beyond their imagining. Several respondents
have wives or daughters involved in tontines. One respondent’s wife was
president of her tontine and collected the money from the other 25
members. She was poor, but had this role because of her royal lineage.
Each member contributes 5 000 CFA per month. The president then
decides who needs the money most, for birth, sickness, marnage and for
house repair.
IV. 2. Results Analysis
IV. 2. I. Description cf Respondents:
The respondents make up an almost homogenous group (see figure ii). This is
consistent with the idea of endogeneity cf regularisation programs in Senegal,
i.e. neighbourhoods have to show the presence of certain characteristics such as
stability, organisation and a wiflingness and abillty te pay in order for
regularisation and upgrading programs te be implemented (Coly, 2006).
Almost ail respondents are household heads, with the exception in Yeumbeul
Layenne, where 7 respondents were not heads. Almost ail were male (157/170),
with the greatest exception in Médina Fass M’Bao, where 5 respondents were
temale. The average age was about 60 years, with the youngest groups in
Yeumbeul Layenne (55, relating to high number of non-head respondents), and
in Médina Fass M’Bao (55, relating te more recent move te current house, 16
years, than other neighbourhood’s respondents). Ail average ages are eider than
the average Senegalese lite expectancy et 54 years.
Residents of the two traditional villages, Yeumbeul Layenne and Médina
Thiaroye Karo, had lived in their houses for the longest periods (bern there; 37
years), and those in Médina Fass M’Bao had lived in their houses for the shortest
period (16 years). Hewever, given that residents of Médina Fass M’Bae are on
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average 5 years younger than in the other areas, this timing corresponds with
being the same age at the time of moving into the house. For example, residents
of Médina Fass M’Bao were on average 39 years old when they moyeU into their
houses (55 minus 76) and residents of Aïnoumady, although they had moyeU in
30 years ago, had been on average 38 years old when they moyeU into their
houses (68 minus 30).
Household sizes were also fairly homogenous, averaging between 11 and 15
members. The exceptions are Yeumbeul Layenne (20), where families tend to
compounds (see image 13), and Aïnoumady (21) where respondents had
significant numbers of tenants residing in their homes.
Image 13: Family
members of
household in
Yeumbeul Layenne
!!‘1 r
H
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In terms of access to services, the neighbourhoods were also fairly homogenous.
Only 8 households reported no access to tap water (5 of these were in Yeumbeul
Layenne). 12 households reported no access to electricity (5 in Yeumbeul).
Several households said that their water or electricity had been shut off after they
had failed to pay. After food, electricity and water were consistently Iisted as the
largest household expenses. A much larger number of households, 52, reported
no access to a fixed phone une. Cost was again cited as a prime reason for this.
fit should be noted that celi phone use is high).
Households in Dalifort reported the highest number of full DS ownership,
corresponding to the neighbourhood’s long-standing regularisation and
upgrading program. Househoids in Médina Fass M’Bao and Aïnoumady had
lower rates DS ownership, corresponding to more recent projects. Yeumbeul
Layenne and Médina Thiaroye Karo, as traditional villages, had no DS owners.
(Yeumbeul had one respondent with a full legal land title. See discussion below).
Respondents were also more or less homogenous in other ways. In the villages
that were flot traditional villages, respondents largely came to the neighbourhood
trom other parts of Dakar, and had mostly previously been renters, with a few
saying that they had lived in crowded family houses. In the traditional villages,
residents of Yeumbeul Layenne were born there, and residents of Médina
Thiaroye Karo arrived from Yeumbeul and Thiaroye, indicating that the traditional
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community had expanded into this adjacent neighbourhood. These respondents
would have been in their eariy twenties upon arrivai in their current houses.
Famiiy structures living in the same househoid and consisting cf one husband,
one wife and their children were most common. A smaiier number of respondents
had more than one wife and their chiidren ail living together under the same roof.
Some respondents aiso reported having wives living eisewhere. Female-headed
househoid respondents were mostly widows with a couple exceptions (divorce,
sick husband, and one was a second wife cf a husband who iived eisewhere).
Virtuaiiy ail respondent’s homes were seif-buiit over a number of years, and
many were having rooms added at the time. House-building was an ongoing
process. Houses had a consistent look throughout the neighbourhoods (see
image 14).
image 14: Typical housing structures: some buiit, some ongoing, in the
Sam Sam area.
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Responses about work were aiso fairly consistent across neighbourhoods. The
most common type of work reported was a trade in the informai sector (mason,
mechanic, electrician, weider, guard, driver, apprenticeship), foliowed by
business in the informai sector (see images 15 and 16). Less common were
respondents or househoid members with work in the formai sector, aIthough a
small minority did work for formai sector businesses, the military, or the local
government. A significant number of respondents, however, reported at Ieast
one household member receiving a pension. Although these pensions are very
smalt and not possible to live off of, they do indicate a significant number of
people with previous employment in the formai sector. A very small number of
respondents reporled a family member abroad sending in remittances. The
exception to this is Thiaroye Gare, where a large number 0f households reported
family members abroad who contribute to DS payments. In the traditional village
of Yeumbeul Layenne, a significant number ot respondents cultivated fields as an
extra source 0f income. Respondents indicated that their wives or daughters
often worked as vendors at the local market.
C
Images 15 and 16: worker in informai business, and informai market
stalis (many of which are run by women) in Thiaroye area
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V. 2. ii. Vaiues and Dreams
Values (see figure iii)
The top three elements contributing the most to respondent’s quaiity of iife are
identified as the following:
1. ‘Having a stable source of revenue for the famiIy’
2. ‘To live in a neighbourhood that is weII lit and weil drained’
3. ‘Having access to a good education for the children’
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These answers are fairly consistent across neighbourhoods. The top choice,
Having a stable source of revenue for the family’ was a top-three choice in ail
neighbourhoods except Aïnoumady. This could perhaps correspond to the older
average age of respondents in Aïnoumady, who were looking toward the future,
as is made evident by their choice of ‘Having access to a good education for the
chiidren’ as theïr top value.
The second overali choice, ‘To live in a neighbourhood that is well lit and well
drained’, was a top-three choice in ail neighbourhoods except Yeumbeul
Layenne, where there has been no regularisation and upgrading program. This is
evidence 0f the importance of the upgrading component to the resident’s
perception of the value of regularisation and upgrading programs. By
comparison, ‘Having security cf housing/property’ was not in the overail top three
choices. The residents of Dalifort, where a regularization project had long-since
been implemented, did Iist this as their third highest value.
The third overall choice, ‘Having access to a good education for the chiidren’, is a
testament to the importance household heads place on the future of their
children.
The respondents from Yeumbeul-Layenne selected ‘having a house that can
shelter ail my family’ as their number one choice. This could be reiated to the
large average household size Yeumbeul-Layenne (20). This couid also be
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related to the fairly large numbers of non-head respondents in this
neighbourhood (7). Non-head respondents, with their wives and children, live in
households run by older brothers or fathers. Many cf them had purchased or
were saving to purchase land in order to build a house for their own famiiy. Ibis
group cf non-head respondents (6/7) also said that they value ‘having enough
funds to pay for ail medial prescriptions’ whereas only 1/12 of household head
respondents in the same neighbourhood did. This may indicate that within a
hcusehold, the head prioritises spending for his own nuclear family, and not for
the families of non-heads.
Another interesting sub-group cf respondents is the group of women. While this
is net a statistically large group (only ten who responded to value and dream
related questions included in the second version cf the questionnaire), the
difference in their responses f rom those cf the men is still striking. The top three
elements contributing the most to female respondent’s quality of 11f e are identified
as the following:
J. ‘Having a stable source of revenue for the family’
2. ‘Having the means to give money to the Iess fortunate of my family’
3. Tied: ‘Having access to services/utilities: water, electricity, telephone’
and ‘Having access to good quality food’
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While the number one choice is consistent with the overail respondent ranking,
the second and third choices are significantly different. The second choice,
‘Having the means to give money to the Iess fortunate 0f my family’, and the tied
third choice, ‘Having access to good quality food’, confirm development theory
that predicts that women spend their resources to help others. The other third
choice of ‘having access to services/utilities: water, electricity, telephone’ shows
that upgrading programs can significantly improve women’s quality of life due to
the alleviation of tasks such as fetching water f rom a well. However, women
headed households, due to their vulnerability and poverty, can be Ieft out of
these benefits. For example, out of the 5 woman-headed households interviewed
in Médina Fass M’Bao, 4 did not have access to phone or electricity, and one
was one of the two households in the overali neighbourhood survey of 30
households with no services at ail. This indicates a disproportionate number of
woman-headed households not benefiting f rom these services.
Dreams: (see ficjure iv)
The top three priorities if respondents had lots of money are the following
(exciuding ‘Travel to Mecca’):
J. ‘Enlarge/ renovate the house to better Iodge the family’
2. ‘Send a child abroad’
3. ‘Obtain a legal land titie for the house’
131
‘Travel to Mecca’ is excluded from this analysis because, although it is
dream/objective of many respondents, it has no direct bearing on quality ot lite as
determined by local factors.
The overali first choice, ‘Enlarge! renovate the house to better lodge the family’,
is a very consistent choice. It is the top choice in five out of six neighbourhoods,
and the third choice in sixth, Médina Thiaroye Karo 1. This is a testament to the
housing crunch in the Dakar region, where increasingly large famiNes must live
together for Iack of other options. As it s a dream/objective, it also indicates that
there is a constraint to household’s ability to do this, otherwise they would have
already enlarged to fit their needs and it would no longer be a dream.
Interestingly, the only neighbourhood where ‘Enlarge! renovate the house to
better Iodge the family’ was flot the number one choice was Médina Thiaroye
Karo 1. Here, despite the tact that this is a traditional village, ‘Obtain a legal land
title for the house’ is the number one response. This indicates that, although
there may be security associated with the status ot a traditional village, there are
perceived benefits associated with a titie that surpass this.
The second choice, ‘Send a child abroad’, is also a top-three choice by ail
respondents. This indicates the importance associated with remittances sent in
by famiiy members living abroad. In fact, while I was in Senegal, a large issue in
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the media was the phenomenon of clandestine immigration, where boatloads of
Senegalese were illegally leaving the country in the hope of arriving and working
in Europe. Residents of Aïnoumady selected ‘Health expenditures’ as their
second choice. This may be a reflection of the older average age of the
respondents.
The third overali choice is ‘Obtain a legal land titie for the house’1. This is a top
three choice in ail neighbourhoods except Dalifort, where regularisation programs
have been in place for several years. Again, respondents in Médina Thiaroye
Karo selected this as their top choice, indicating that the acquisition of a title
holds a value beyond the security associated with their traditional village.
Respondents from Yeumbeul Layenne, another traditional village, also selected
this as a top-three choice. However, only 1/7 non-head respondents in Yeumbeul
indicated ‘Obtain a legal land title for the house’ as a top-three objective,
whereas 6/12 head respondents said it was.
Another discrepancy between non-head respondents and head respondents is
that 4/7 non-head respondents indicated ‘send a child to university’ as a top three
objective, whereas 0/12 head respondents indicated so.
Residents of Dalifort, who almost ail already hold a title (23/25), selected ‘open a
bank account’ as their third choice. This indicates that this is little correlation
This wording is deliberate. Residents had littie howiedge or understanding ofthe nuances between a full
legal titie and a DS. What is important in this context is that both confer legality.
I—,
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between having a titie and obtaining access to tinancial institutions. However, it
may indicate a correlation between holding a titie and wanting access to financial
institutions. Most respondents who indicated that they would like to open a bank
account stated that this would be used to save money. Once a titie is obtained, it
seems, residents have money that they wouid like to save. It could also be that
through the mechanism of the GIE, residents of Dalifort became accustomed to
saving through a more formai institution, and would like to be able to continue
this individually.
Finally, the 10 women respondents seiected the following top three priorities if
they had lots of money (exciuding ‘Travel to Mecca’):
J. ‘Send a child abroad’
2. ‘Enlarge! renovate the house to better iodge the family’
3. ‘Start a business’
While the first two responses correspond, in reverse order, to the responses of
the group of overall respondents, the third choice, ‘start a business’, is unique to
the group of women. Women are otten already vendors in the informai sector, at
markets and on the streets. Ohen such vendors are not independent but seN for
a centralized distributor. The dream of starting a business may correspond to
obtaining additional capital for creating an independent business. Also, since
‘start a business’ replaces ‘Obtain a legal land titie for the house’ in the women’s
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ranking, it could indicate that women associate the titiing process with male, flot
female ownership tout of these 10 woman-headed households, 3 had the
women’s names on the Deeds of sale, and 1 had a woman’s name on the full DS
titie) , or simply that they have other priorities.
IV. 2. iii. Perceptions of security and titles
AIl respondents said that they own their houses, regardless of the neighbourhood
they Iived in and their tenure status. This indicates that resident’s perception is
that they are the rightful and legal owners ot their property. Fear of eviction was
also virtually non-existent, regardless of neighbourhood and tenure status. In
Yeumbeul Layenne and Médina Thiaroye Karo 1 respondents said that they felt
safe trom eviction because they lived in a traditional village which was sacred
and untouchable. Residents of other neighbourhoods, many of whom had
previously rented, and some of whom had been evicted f rom other
neighbourhoods, also said that they did not fear eviction. This is a reflection of
the long time residents have lived their houses in these neighbourhoods (on
average 16 to 30 years), and is likely also associated with their perception of
their rightful ownership, even without a DS.
Without exception, aIl respondents also said that it was very important to own a
house and not to rent. In some cases, this was due to past experience of being a
tenant, which was characterized as burdensome and insecure. At least one
C
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respondent who had previously rented said that he had been robbed as a renter.
Ownership was also associated with social status and a more secure future.
However, the most common answer, in ail neighbourhoods, was that it is very
expensive ta rent. As a renter, respondents said that it was very difficuit to save
money and ta budget finances. Ownership was thus associated with freedom,
security, and ability to control one’s life. Since property taxes do flot appear to be
enforced, ownership, in any form, is associated with the ability to save. In fact,
this was confirmed by the group of non-head respondents. While not renters,
they also Iacked control over their lives, as household heads were frequentiy
decision makers. The non-head respondents were, as a resuit, saving to buy
land and build their own house.
In Yeubeul, the son of the Lébou community, who had much stature in the
community (numerous people came by his house ta pay respects during the
course of our interview), paid ta have his house separated from the communal
property and accorded a full title. He told me that he did this in order ta avoid
future inter-family disputes once his father died. This indicates that security from
eviction is not necessarily the only, or even the most important, type of security.
Security in the context of family and community is also essential. Further,
obtaining a legal land titie for the house was the top dream (see figure iv) among
respondents in Médina Thiaroye Karo 1, despite the security they had from their
traditional village.
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Almost aIl respondents saw the outcomes of obtaining a DS in a positive light.
Respondents said that a DS allowed people to leave a solid legacy for their heirs,
to have protection from being harassed or evicted by the state, and to have
peace of mmd. When respondents told me this, I pointed out that they had lived
in the same house for a long time, and that had just told me that they had no fear
of eviction and had neyer been threatened of eviction while living there. I asked
how a DS would alter this. Respondents did not have an answer. This added to
my growing suspicion that respondents were parroting answers that had been
told to them regarding the value of a DS. In fact, when asked about the outcomes
of a DS, many respondents gave me answers that were virtually word-for-word
identical to the responses of other respondents. This made me suspect that
respondents were repeating phrases they had been told by those encouraging
them to make payments into their DS. I could not confirm this suspicion.
One or two respondents told me that they felt forced to participate and pay for the
DS, despite the fact that the payments were very difficult for them. Given that the
respondents who answered in this way did seem poor and had real ditficulty in
paying, this type 0f answer indicates that the DS is wanted by the better-off
members 0f the community, while marginalised and vuinerable households had
other priorities.
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IV. 2. iv. Spending and Finance
Percentages and amounts 0f spending: food is biggest expense. Utilities, medical
supplies, school fees, ceremonies and clothing are mentioned as other large
expenses.
OnIy respondents with jobs in the formai sector had bank accounts, but aimost
none used this to access credit. They used it to save money. For example, in
Aïnoumady, 7 respondents said they had a bank account and used it for saving.
In Médina Fass M’Bao, 5 respondents said they had a bank account and used it
for saving in order to rebuild and repair house (otten damaged by flooding), or to
buy a new house. People who wanted a bank account said that they wanted one
for saving. Many respondents without bank accounts laughed at the suggestion,
impiying that the notion of owning an account was beyond their imagination due
to the cost associated with having one. For example, one respondent stated that
“It is beffer that my family eats and dresses weII than to have a bank account’.
Many proponents cf de jure tenure regularisation programs promote land titiing
as a way to accessing financiai institutions and to obtain bans or credit, thus
kick-starting a snowballing process cf long-term productivity. In this case,
however, there was little correlation between the acquisition cf a DS and access
C
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to or demand for credit. For example, in Aïnoumady, 9 respondents had a DS,
0 but none had used it to access credit.
o
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IV. 3. Discussion of Resuits
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the type of impact and influence that
tenure regularisation programs in informai settiements have on househoid
economic behaviours such as saving and accessing credit, as weB as on
househoid perceptions reiating to security, values, and objectives. This
discussion will look first at the influence of tenure regularisation on household
savings and demand for credit, then at the influence of regularisation programs
on perceptions of security, and lastly at the impact of tenure reguiarisation on
values and objectives.
IV. 3. L Economic behaviour
The economic incentive model to tenure regularisation posits that enhancing
household security through formai titling leads to more efficient allocation of
household resources, which in turn will lead to increased productivity. This model
is constructed in two parts: first by showing that lack of tenure security is a
binding constraint on efficient househoid behaviour, and second by showing that
Iack of tenure security is a constraint on accessing the full value of property
associated with other financial mechanisms such as credit.
C
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In the case 0f the informai settiements studied, insecurity in the form of threat of
eviction is virtually non-existent. HousehoIds without formai tenure rights either
have security from their traditionai villages, or feel secure enough from iong-term
informai ownership. The greatest form of insecurity, based on the interviews, is
associated with being a non-head member of the household.
Non-head members do flot participate in financial decisions, and their future
inheritance rights are in question. This inferior, insecure position may distort the
behaviours of non-head members. For example, the group of non-head
respondents overwhelmingly reported that ‘having enough funds to pay for ail
medial prescriptions’ was a key value to them, whereas oniy a smaii fraction of
household head respondent did. This may indicate that within a household, the
head prioritises spending for his own nuclear family, and not for the families of
non-heads. As a behaviour response, non-head members may spend more time
at the house to ensure that the needs of their own nuclear tamilies are being met.
Another discrepancy between non-beaU respondents and head respondents is
that over haif of non-head respondents indicated ‘send a child to university’ as a
top three objective, whereas no household head respondents indicated so. This
indicates that non-heads want to ensure that their children are not left in the
same insecure state as they are.
How does the awarding of property tities, in this case the DS, impact this
situation? A telling response is that only 1/7 non-head respondents in Yeumbeul
f
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Layenne indicated ‘Obtain a legai land titie for the house’ as a top-three
objective, whereas 6/12 head respondents said it was. While overall househoid
security is estabiished through this community’s traditional rights to the land here,
intra-household dynamics apparently give cause for insecurity. The wish of
household heads to solidify their ownership status through legal tities indicates
that even this group feels some insecurity associated with lack of formai tenure.
Other family members, not their own children, may have inheritance rights. As
such, a formai titie can cernent the househoid head’s right to the property, as weii
as their children’s rights. Awareness that formai tenure may reduce any daims
they may have on family property Ieads non-head respondents ta distort their
own economic behaviour in order to save money ta purchase their own land.
The second part of the economic incentive modei shows iack of tenure security
ta be a constraint on accessing the full value of property associated with other
financial mechanisms such as credit. Comments tram DS-holders in Dalifort
indicate that the value ot their properly did increase with the awarding of the DS.
It is Iikely that this is due to a range of factors, including neighbourhood
upgrading as weII as more formai rights. However, as residents of Dalifort, who
almost ail already hold a title (23/25), selected ‘open a bank account’ as their
third dream/objective, it is unlikely that this increase in value is directly linked to
increased access ta formai credit. Not oniy, it seems, 15 there no correiation
between in the acquisition 0f a DS and access to credit, but there is no
o
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correlation between the acquisition of a DS and access to a bank account, which
C
costs money.
Is lack of access to credit a binding constraint for anyone? Lack of access to
credit seems to be a binding constraint for those involved in business. For
example, one respondent with a welding shop with about 10 employees said that
he could not process large orders due to Iack ot capital. There were similar
comments from respondents involved in selling goods. Some said that the
amount of capital available through micro-credit programs was not sufficient to
make a difference in their business.
Because of this relation between access to credit and those involved in business,
Iack of access to credit appears to be a binding constraint disproportionately for
women. Women are very often involved in smali businesses, and as such could
benefit from extra capital to invest. For example, one respondent said that his
daughter seils fabrics at market and wants to grow her business, but she is
constrained by lack of finances and financing. However, the respondent also said
that his two sons are in the military, one works abroad, and the other chiidren are
in private school. This indicates that there are family funds available, but they are
not being allocated to help the daughter with her business. This indicates that
women are often excluded trom many patriarchal networks of informai lending.
Tontine groupings are a response to this, but funds most often are used for
family ceremonies and urgent needs.
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Need to do longer term analysis to see if having tenure made a ditference
— je if
peopie reaiiy do start doing bigger saving, it could have influence on long-term
productivity.
in terms of dreams and objectives with associated binding constraints, the overali
consistent dreams and objectives of the group ot ail respondents were ‘Enlarge!
renovate the house to better lodge the famiiy’, and ‘Send a child abroad’. Access
to credit may be a real binding constraint, especially on this first dream. However,
respondents also overwhelmingly indicated that ‘Having a stable source of
revenue for the famiiy’ was their top value. This indicates that while respondents
are faced with binding constraints, the more significant one is iack ot access to
stable employment, and not iack cf access to credit2.
The issue of affordability is an important one, as in many tenure regularisation
systems it has been shown that only a small proportion of househoids can afford
even the subsidised cost of a plot with titie. In this way, regularisation programs
can become a process for the more powerul and influential groups to get
themselves registered as owner to the disadvantage of others (Payne, 2001). For
poor households in this case study which were often headed by women or the
sick, paying for the DS represents a significant financiai challenge3. Thus, the
2 s also important to note that there are cultural aversions to credit. For example, the Muslim religion looks
oorly on debt.
Documents from the FDV show the DS to cost between 200 000 and 600 000 depending on the
size of the property.
144
cost of this regularisation program has the potential to negatively impact the
economic behaviour of poor households, if they feit pushed enough to allocate
household resources to the payment of a DS. However, many such households
choose flot to pay. The documents heads of poor households showed me often
indicated payments of 1 000 to 5 000 CFA made three or tour times in the past,
totalling perhaps 20 0000 out of a total cost of 300 000 CFA, and no more. This
indicates that these households had other priorities besides the payment of a DS.
The benefits associated with a DS were flot enough 0f an iflcefltive to motivate
these households to distort their resources away from more urgent needs, and
the GIE did flot put enough pressure to force these households to pay4. The
question thus becomes flot how the acquisition of a titie wilI affect the economic
behaviour of certain households, but how being excluded from a regularisation
program due to lack of resources will impact vuinerable households.
As such, access to regularised tenure seems to have a moderate influence on
household saving, especially for non-head household members, but not on
demand for credit. Tenure regularisation with affordability issues has the potential
to accentuate disparity within a community.
In my interview with Malik Coly of the FDV, I asked him what would happen to households who could flot
afford to pay. He told me that he could flot give an answer to that question (CoIy, 2006)
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IV. 3. ii. Perception cf security
r
Ail household heads interviewed for this case study, regardless 0f the legal
status cf their property tille, responded that they owned their property. Ail
respondents said that they did flot fear eviction. On average, the respondents
had been living on their property between 16 years and ail of their lives. In this
context, in which households have many characteristics that can be proxied for
security, it is interesting to examine the impact cf a tenure regularisation program
on the perception of security.
Despite the apparent high leveis cf security, obtaining a iegai land titie for the
house was a top-three choice in ail neighbourhoods besides Dalifort, where
aimost ail respondents aiready had a DS. in fact, residents cf Yeumbeui
Layenne and Médina Ihiaroye Karo, where security is guaranteed by community
status as a traditionai village, both seiected obtaining a tille as second choice in
terms of dreams and objectives (see figure iv).
This seems to indicate that even for household heads, security from eviction is
flot necessariiy the only, or even the most important, type of security. More
important is establishing long-term guarantees that the property wiii be passed
down to one’s own children. This is evident from the fact that the son of the
Lébou chief in Yeumbeul Layenne separated his own parcel from the communal
land in order to protect his property for his own chiidren. Also evidence ot this is
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that non-heads interviewed in Yeumbeul did flot Iist obtaining a titie as an
objective. The assumption being that a titie would be awarded to their eider
brother or someone higher than themselves in the famiiy hierarchy, thus
exciuding them. A reIated issue to this is that residents apparently do accept the
legitimacy of land tities. This speaks to the strength of Senegalese institutions.
Formaiised tenure seems to improve the perception 0f security for household
heads with regards to daims f rom other family members, but not necessarily with
regards to the threat of expropriation. However, for vuinerable groups such as
the poor, renters and women, tenure regularisation programs may have different
influences on the perception of security.
In one interview, for exampie, a househoid head whose property had been
severeiy damaged by flooding said that he had received no heip from the
community or local government in repairing the damage. He blamed this iack of
heip to the fact that he had made very few payments toward the DS, and he was
incapable of paying more as they were very poor. Whether this was true or flot is
not necessarily important. What is important, however, is the sense of
vulnerability and exclusion, and thus heightened insecurity, this poor househoid
owner felt as a resuit of the regularisation program in his community.
In addition to poor househoids, renters may aiso have a perception of security
that is adverseiy affected by reguiarisation. Renters tend to be at the bottom o f
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household hierarchy. No one wants to be a renter. One respondent stated that he
would rather live in a garbage dump than be a renter. In general renting was said
to be expensive, unstable, not peaceful, and a hardship. The acquisition of a
property and of a DS was perceived as a relief f rom burden of paying rent. In
fact, this Ieap from status as a renter to status as an owner, no matter what kind
of titie was held, seemed to confer the greatest sense of peace, security and
weII-being on household heads. Thus, while no renters were directly interviewed
in this study, it can be assumed that the security of this group is already 10w.
Other studies in cities across the globe show that providing small landiords with
titles wilI exacerbate evictions of the most vuinerable social groups, such as
renting tenants (Payne, 2001). In this way, there is a possible regressive impact
of titling on rent-paying tenants and on their perception of their own security
(Baharoglu, 2002).
Women are another group whose perception of security can be influenced by
regularisation programs. As the sample group of respondents shows, titling as
implemented through the Dalifort Method reinforces patriarchal notions of
ownership by conferring almost aIl titles to men. Women are thus dependent on
their association with men for their access to land. Wives and daughters of
household heads may feel more secure in their rights to property, as the title can
help them to stave off property daims from other relatives at the time of
inheritance. There was evidence of this effect in the sub-sample of women
respondents, several of whom were widows. These widows became household
14$
heads, and often the name on the DS titie was changed to their own name, flot
their husband’s. There is thus the potential 0f increased sense 0f security among
some women, which is dependent on the strength and enforceability of property
rights. For other, less advantaged women, titiing can serve to reinforce their
exclusion from important resources. However, the mere act of upgrading may
increase de facto security for women in these informai neighbourhoods, as
traditionally female tasks such as fetching weli water are eased by access to
services, in fact, the sub-set 0f women respondents chose ‘having access to
services/utilities: water, eiectricity, telephone’ as a top-three value contributing to
their quallty of life, while the men did not.
IV.
.
iii. Values and objectives
Given the consistency in responses in neighbourhoods with varying degrees of
legal tenure status, it would appear that the tenure regularisation program has
iittie infiuence on resident’s values and dreams. For example, ‘Having a stable
source of revenue for the famiiy’ was iisted as the first or second value for aimost
ail neighbourhoods, and ‘Enlarge! renovate the house to better lodge the family’
was listed as a top-three dream/objective for ail neighbourhoods (see tables iii
and iv). The group of Dalifort respondents, who have almost aIl been conferred a
DS, differ significantly from the other neighbourhoods in that they value ‘Having
security of housing/property’ and that they dream to ‘open a bank account’.
Since this comparison of values and dreams is between a fairly homogenous
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group of older male household heads with a perception of ownership, it may be
C
more interesting in the future to compare the change in values and objectives of
different sub-groups, such as women, non-heads and renters, after the
implementation of a regularization program.
V. Conclusion
C
In the context of increasing urbanisation on a global scale, this paper aimed to
investigate one of the main policy areas focussing on improving the lives of the
urban poor living in informai sefflements: tenure regularisation programs. The
more specific goal of this paper was to investigate the type of impact and
influence that tenure regularisation programs in informai settiements have on
household economic behaviours such as saving and accessing credit, as weil as
on househoid perceptions relating to security, values, and objectives. This
research was in the form of a case study and is based on extensive interviews in
the informai settlements in the Pikine region in Senegai. The communities
inciuded in this study were: Sam Sam I, Thiaroye Gare, Dalifort, Yeumbeul
Layenne, Médina Thiaroye Karo 1, Médina Fass M’bao, and Aïnoumady.
Access to reguiarised tenure seems to have a moderate influence on household
saving but flot on demand for credit. Formalised teflure seems to improve the
perception of security for household heads with regards to daims from other
family members, but not necessarily with regards to the threat of expropriation.
The values and objectives of the respondents may be more influenced by their
status in their househoid and in their community more than by their tenure status.
Endogenous factors such as program affordability and perception of ownership
regardless of legal status have a strong influence on the impact that this program
has at the household level.
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Annex: Questionnaires First and Second versions
First Version
Househoid Questionnaire
Neighbourhood where the household is located:
_____
Description of the respondent
1. Male Female
_________
2. Age
3. Lived in neighbourhood for
____ _____
years;
Originatly f rom
4. Head of the househoid: Yes No
Description 0f the household
5. How many peopie lie in the house
_ _____ ________
6. Number of children (15 years and younger)
7. Number of aduits
________ ___ _
8. Number of men
_
_
women
9. Describe the family connections ot this household (i.e. ail members 0f one
family, same mother and father, number of couples etc)
10. Number of adults who work
___________________
11. Type and place ofwork:
• Adult 1 (M/E)
• Adult2(M.F)
• Adult 3 (MIE)
• Adult4(M.F)
• Adult 5 (MIE)
• Aduit6(M.F)
12. Is there a business in the house: Yes
_
No
_
_
If yes, what kind of business?
__ ______
VProperty Tities
13. Do you have a property titie? Yes
_____
(see 14—21) No
_____
(see 22-23)
14. If yes, what kind?
Lease
________________
DS
______________ ____
Legal titie
_____
Customary right
Other
___ __ _
Don’t know
______ _____ ___
15. Since when have you had this title?
___ __
16. Who does the titie belong to?
HeaU cf household
Other, who
17. How much did the title cost?
____ _
How did you finance this?
GIE
_
___
Bank
_ _ __ ___
Family funds
_ _
1$. Have you used this title to:
Access credit
Try to seli the property
lnvest in the built house
_ ___ _
Nothing
Other
__
19. Has the value of your property increased since you obtained the title?
Yes No
_
Don’t know
____
If yes, by how much
_ _
20. According to you, what are the outcomes (positive, negative) coming from the
accord ing cf a properly titie (ex. lncreased sense cf security, toc many taxes etc)
21. Are there taxes associated with your property titie? Yes No
How much?
_
22. If not, is there a process for obtaining a title underway?
a. Yes, since
_ _ _
We anticipate obtaining the titie
No
__ ___
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23. Would you like to obtain a property titie? If yes, why, if no, why not?
_______
Economic Behaviour
Expenses:
24. What are the percentages and approximate amounts that go to:
• Food (including gas for cooking)
• Water
_____________________
• Taxes
• Clothing
• Transportation
• Education
• Electricity
• Other
25. Do ail those who work contribute to daily expenses?
• Yes
__
• No
_ _ _ _
26. Aside f rom small-scale expenses daily expenses (food, gas), what are the
most important household expenses (ex. Fridge, television — expenses that you
may have to save for) (can check more than one category)
Education of children
_ ___ ______________
Construction (i.e. rooms, roof)
Household equipment (fridge, furniture)
Other
____ ____ _______
Access to credit! tinancing
27. How do you access financing? (How much?)
Tontines
_ _ _ ____ _
Credit: bank (which bank)
Individual saving
Family abroad
__ _
Other
Doesn’t access financing
28. Does your property titie help you access financing? Yes
_____
No
_
Why, how
29. Other
vii
Second version
Qualitative household questionnaire
Neighbourhood where the househoid is located:__________________
Description of the respondent:
Head of household: yes
________
no
_________
(if ne, what is relation with household beaU?
_____________________
Male
_________
Femaie
______
Age
__ _____
1. Your values Impressions ofthe interviewer:
What are the 3 elements from the foilowing list that,
according to you, can contribute the most to your quaiity cf lite?
- Honesty ofthe respondent:
o Having good quality clothing
o Having access to services/utiiities: water, eiectricity, telephone
o Having access to good quality food
o Having a house that can shelter ail my tamiiy
o Having many chiidren
o Having access to a good education tor the children
o Having security of housing/property
o Having a stable source ot revenue ter the tamily
o Having your own business
o Having enough funds to pay ter ail medial prescriptions
o Having the means to give meney te the less tertunate et my family
- the means cf the household
o Te ive in a neighbeurhood that is weli lit and well Urained
o other
2. Your dreams/ objectives
if yeu had lots ot money, what would be your 3 priorities trom the
foilowing list:
o Having more chiidren
o Having more wives
o Travel te Mecca
o Send a chiid abread
o SenU a child te university
- the health ofthe familyo Health expenditures
o Better toed for the tamily
o Enlarge/ renevate the bouse te better ledge the famiiy
o Enlarge the bouse te bouse tenants
o Start a business
o Buy a new heuse
o Obtain a legal land titie ter the heuse
o Newclething
o Open a bank account
o Other
- other
Description of the household:
vil’
Who lives in the house (ex. ail members of one famiiy, number of married couples, number of chiidren
etc)
3. Do you have other wives elsewhere?
___________________
4. How many bedrooms are there?
____ __
5. Do you have access to: electricity
_;
water from a tap
_______;
in-home telephone
6. Are you the owner of your house Yes No
7. s it important for you to be an owner and not a renter? Yes No
Why
____________________________
When did you buy your house and where were you previously?
Why did you corne to this neighbourhood?
Frorn whom did you buy the property?
For how much?
What kind of paper (document) do you have for this property, and whose name s on the paper?_
(it DS, see # 10)
Have you ever had difficuities with regard to the security ot your property (ex. expropriation or threat of
expropriation?)
is it sornething that you are worried about?
__ ________________________
8. Describe the changes to the built form (of house) since you have iived in the house. (Improvement to roof,
number of rooms etc.)
9. To whom will the house belong after you are dead? (ex. Wife, eldest son, ail chiidren, the state, don’t
know)
Property Tities
10. Since when do you have the DS?
___ _
11. Whose name is t in?
___ ____________
12. How much did the property title cost?
__
How did you pay for this (individuai saving, farniiy saving, tamily abroad, credit, tontine, etc)
13. Have you used this property titie as a guarantee? (ex. For accessing credit):
14. According to you, what are the outcomes (positive, negative) coming from the according of a property
titie (ex. increased sense ot security, too many taxes etc)
15. is a process for accessing a titie underway?
a. Yes, since
___ ______
We anticipate obtaining the titie
b. Number of payrnents to date:
__ _
c. Since:
____
d. Amount of the payments:
ix
e. No
Economic Behaviour
Revenue:
16. Types and places of work, who (M/F, age): (abroad, informai and formai work, pension etc)
17. s there an at-home business: Yes No
If yes, what kind of business?
______________________________________________________________
Expenses:
18. What are the percentages and approximate amounts that go to:
• Food fincluding gas for cooking)
• Water
• Medical prescriptions
• Telephone
• Other
19. Number of chiidren at school
— age, sex, private or public school, cost
_________
20. Who contributes financially to expenses: (head, children, family elsewhere etc)
21. Who contributes to decisions on expenses:
22. Do you have a bank / mutual account savings in tontine? Yes No
23. Have you fever) saved money? Why, for how long, how much
___
o
o
